Optimally Dictatorial Committees
Fuente:
arXiv
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| Autor principal: | |
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| Formato: | Preprint |
| Publicado: |
2025
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| Acceso en línea: | |
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| _version_ | 1866915421067673600 |
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| author | Akkar, D. Carlos |
| author_facet | Akkar, D. Carlos |
| contents | I study the optimal voting mechanism for a committee that must decide whether to enact or block a policy of unknown benefit. Information can come both from committee members who can acquire it at cost, and a strategic lobbyist who wishes the policy to be enacted. I show that the dictatorship of the most-demanding member is a dominant voting mechanism: any other voting mechanism is (i) less likely to enact a good policy, (ii) more likely to enact a bad policy, and (iii) burdens each member with a greater cost of acquiring information. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2507_21699 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2025 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Optimally Dictatorial Committees Akkar, D. Carlos Theoretical Economics I study the optimal voting mechanism for a committee that must decide whether to enact or block a policy of unknown benefit. Information can come both from committee members who can acquire it at cost, and a strategic lobbyist who wishes the policy to be enacted. I show that the dictatorship of the most-demanding member is a dominant voting mechanism: any other voting mechanism is (i) less likely to enact a good policy, (ii) more likely to enact a bad policy, and (iii) burdens each member with a greater cost of acquiring information. |
| title | Optimally Dictatorial Committees |
| topic | Theoretical Economics |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2507.21699 |