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Détails bibliographiques
Auteur principal:	Akkar, D. Carlos
Format:	Preprint
Publié:	2025
Sujets:	Theoretical Economics
Accès en ligne:	https://arxiv.org/abs/2507.21699
Tags:	Ajouter un tag Pas de tags, Soyez le premier à ajouter un tag!

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