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| Main Authors: | , , , |
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| Format: | Preprint |
| Published: |
2025
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| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | https://arxiv.org/abs/2507.21795 |
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| _version_ | 1866913965040205824 |
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| author | Ramirez, Maria Alejandra Nagel, Rosemarie Wolpert, David Jost, Jürgen |
| author_facet | Ramirez, Maria Alejandra Nagel, Rosemarie Wolpert, David Jost, Jürgen |
| contents | Commitments play a crucial role in game theory, shaping strategic interactions by either altering a player's own payoffs or influencing the incentives of others through outcome-contingent payments. While most research has focused on using commitments to achieve efficient equilibria, their potential applications beyond this goal remain largely unexplored. In this study, we introduce a non-coercive extortion mechanism that leverages commitments to outcome-contingent payments, demonstrating how a player or external agent can extract profit by offering rewards rather than threatening punishment. At the core of the mechanism is the introduction of sequentiality into a simultaneous-move game, fundamentally reshaping the strategic interaction. We derive the conditions under which extortion is successful, identify the class of games susceptible to this scheme, and determine both the maximum extractable profit and the minimum required payment. To illustrate the extortion mechanism, we apply it to 2x2 games, highlighting how even simple strategic settings can be vulnerable to this form of manipulation. Our results reveal strategic vulnerabilities in competitive settings, with significant implications for economic markets, diplomatic relations, and multi-agent systems operating in blockchain environments. This work broadens our understanding of commitments in game theory and raises critical questions about how to safeguard strategic interactions from exploitation through non-coercive extortion. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2507_21795 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2025 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Non-coercive extortion in game theory Ramirez, Maria Alejandra Nagel, Rosemarie Wolpert, David Jost, Jürgen Computer Science and Game Theory Commitments play a crucial role in game theory, shaping strategic interactions by either altering a player's own payoffs or influencing the incentives of others through outcome-contingent payments. While most research has focused on using commitments to achieve efficient equilibria, their potential applications beyond this goal remain largely unexplored. In this study, we introduce a non-coercive extortion mechanism that leverages commitments to outcome-contingent payments, demonstrating how a player or external agent can extract profit by offering rewards rather than threatening punishment. At the core of the mechanism is the introduction of sequentiality into a simultaneous-move game, fundamentally reshaping the strategic interaction. We derive the conditions under which extortion is successful, identify the class of games susceptible to this scheme, and determine both the maximum extractable profit and the minimum required payment. To illustrate the extortion mechanism, we apply it to 2x2 games, highlighting how even simple strategic settings can be vulnerable to this form of manipulation. Our results reveal strategic vulnerabilities in competitive settings, with significant implications for economic markets, diplomatic relations, and multi-agent systems operating in blockchain environments. This work broadens our understanding of commitments in game theory and raises critical questions about how to safeguard strategic interactions from exploitation through non-coercive extortion. |
| title | Non-coercive extortion in game theory |
| topic | Computer Science and Game Theory |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2507.21795 |