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| Main Authors: | , , , , , |
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| Format: | Preprint |
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2025
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| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | https://arxiv.org/abs/2507.22880 |
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| _version_ | 1866909712460546048 |
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| author | Ling, Hai Wang, Tianchi Liu, Xiaohao Tao, Zhulin Yang, Lifang Huang, Xianglin |
| author_facet | Ling, Hai Wang, Tianchi Liu, Xiaohao Tao, Zhulin Yang, Lifang Huang, Xianglin |
| contents | Modern Visual-Aware Recommender Systems (VARS) exploit the integration of user interaction data and visual features to deliver personalized recommendations with high precision. However, their robustness against adversarial attacks remains largely underexplored, posing significant risks to system reliability and security. Existing attack strategies suffer from notable limitations: shilling attacks are costly and detectable, and visual-only perturbations often fail to align with user preferences. To address these challenges, we propose AUV-Fusion, a cross-modal adversarial attack framework that adopts high-order user preference modeling and cross-modal adversary generation. Specifically, we obtain robust user embeddings through multi-hop user-item interactions and transform them via an MLP into semantically aligned perturbations. These perturbations are injected onto the latent space of a pre-trained VAE within the diffusion model. By synergistically integrating genuine user interaction data with visually plausible perturbations, AUV-Fusion eliminates the need for injecting fake user profiles and effectively mitigates the challenge of insufficient user preference extraction inherent in traditional visual-only attacks. Comprehensive evaluations on diverse VARS architectures and real-world datasets demonstrate that AUV-Fusion significantly enhances the exposure of target (cold-start) items compared to conventional baseline methods. Moreover, AUV-Fusion maintains exceptional stealth under rigorous scrutiny. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2507_22880 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2025 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | AUV-Fusion: Cross-Modal Adversarial Fusion of User Interactions and Visual Perturbations Against VARS Ling, Hai Wang, Tianchi Liu, Xiaohao Tao, Zhulin Yang, Lifang Huang, Xianglin Information Retrieval Modern Visual-Aware Recommender Systems (VARS) exploit the integration of user interaction data and visual features to deliver personalized recommendations with high precision. However, their robustness against adversarial attacks remains largely underexplored, posing significant risks to system reliability and security. Existing attack strategies suffer from notable limitations: shilling attacks are costly and detectable, and visual-only perturbations often fail to align with user preferences. To address these challenges, we propose AUV-Fusion, a cross-modal adversarial attack framework that adopts high-order user preference modeling and cross-modal adversary generation. Specifically, we obtain robust user embeddings through multi-hop user-item interactions and transform them via an MLP into semantically aligned perturbations. These perturbations are injected onto the latent space of a pre-trained VAE within the diffusion model. By synergistically integrating genuine user interaction data with visually plausible perturbations, AUV-Fusion eliminates the need for injecting fake user profiles and effectively mitigates the challenge of insufficient user preference extraction inherent in traditional visual-only attacks. Comprehensive evaluations on diverse VARS architectures and real-world datasets demonstrate that AUV-Fusion significantly enhances the exposure of target (cold-start) items compared to conventional baseline methods. Moreover, AUV-Fusion maintains exceptional stealth under rigorous scrutiny. |
| title | AUV-Fusion: Cross-Modal Adversarial Fusion of User Interactions and Visual Perturbations Against VARS |
| topic | Information Retrieval |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2507.22880 |