Provably Secure Retrieval-Augmented Generation
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arXiv
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| Main Authors: | , , |
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| Format: | Preprint |
| Published: |
2025
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| _version_ | 1866908476690661376 |
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| author | Zhou, Pengcheng Feng, Yinglun Yang, Zhongliang |
| author_facet | Zhou, Pengcheng Feng, Yinglun Yang, Zhongliang |
| contents | Although Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) systems have been widely applied, the privacy and security risks they face, such as data leakage and data poisoning, have not been systematically addressed yet. Existing defense strategies primarily rely on heuristic filtering or enhancing retriever robustness, which suffer from limited interpretability, lack of formal security guarantees, and vulnerability to adaptive attacks. To address these challenges, this paper proposes the first provably secure framework for RAG systems(SAG). Our framework employs a pre-storage full-encryption scheme to ensure dual protection of both retrieved content and vector embeddings, guaranteeing that only authorized entities can access the data. Through formal security proofs, we rigorously verify the scheme's confidentiality and integrity under a computational security model. Extensive experiments across multiple benchmark datasets demonstrate that our framework effectively resists a range of state-of-the-art attacks. This work establishes a theoretical foundation and practical paradigm for verifiably secure RAG systems, advancing AI-powered services toward formally guaranteed security. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2508_01084 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2025 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Provably Secure Retrieval-Augmented Generation Zhou, Pengcheng Feng, Yinglun Yang, Zhongliang Cryptography and Security Artificial Intelligence Although Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) systems have been widely applied, the privacy and security risks they face, such as data leakage and data poisoning, have not been systematically addressed yet. Existing defense strategies primarily rely on heuristic filtering or enhancing retriever robustness, which suffer from limited interpretability, lack of formal security guarantees, and vulnerability to adaptive attacks. To address these challenges, this paper proposes the first provably secure framework for RAG systems(SAG). Our framework employs a pre-storage full-encryption scheme to ensure dual protection of both retrieved content and vector embeddings, guaranteeing that only authorized entities can access the data. Through formal security proofs, we rigorously verify the scheme's confidentiality and integrity under a computational security model. Extensive experiments across multiple benchmark datasets demonstrate that our framework effectively resists a range of state-of-the-art attacks. This work establishes a theoretical foundation and practical paradigm for verifiably secure RAG systems, advancing AI-powered services toward formally guaranteed security. |
| title | Provably Secure Retrieval-Augmented Generation |
| topic | Cryptography and Security Artificial Intelligence |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2508.01084 |