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| Main Authors: | , , |
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| Format: | Preprint |
| Published: |
2025
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| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | https://arxiv.org/abs/2508.01144 |
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| _version_ | 1866912516128374784 |
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| author | Shang, Jiahui Zhang, Luning Zheng, Zhongxiang |
| author_facet | Shang, Jiahui Zhang, Luning Zheng, Zhongxiang |
| contents | While traditional cryptographic research focuses on algorithm-level provable security, many real-world attacks exploit weaknesses in system implementations, such as memory mismanagement, poor entropy sources, and insecure key lifecycles. Existing approaches address these risks in isolation but lack a unified, verifiable framework for modeling implementation-layer security. In this work, we propose Implementation-Level Provable Security, a new paradigm that defines security in terms of structurally verifiable resilience against real-world attack surfaces during deployment. To demonstrate its feasibility, we present SEER (Secure and Efficient Encryption-based Erasure via Ransomware), a file destruction system that repurposes and reinforces the encryption core of Babuk ransomware. SEER incorporates key erasure, entropy validation, and execution consistency checks to ensure a well-constrained, auditable attack surface. Our evaluation shows that SEER achieves strong irrecoverability guarantees while maintaining practical performance. This work demonstrates a shift from abstract theoretical models toward practically verifiable implementation-layer security. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2508_01144 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2025 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Beyond Algorithmic Proofs: Towards Implementation-Level Provable Security Shang, Jiahui Zhang, Luning Zheng, Zhongxiang Cryptography and Security While traditional cryptographic research focuses on algorithm-level provable security, many real-world attacks exploit weaknesses in system implementations, such as memory mismanagement, poor entropy sources, and insecure key lifecycles. Existing approaches address these risks in isolation but lack a unified, verifiable framework for modeling implementation-layer security. In this work, we propose Implementation-Level Provable Security, a new paradigm that defines security in terms of structurally verifiable resilience against real-world attack surfaces during deployment. To demonstrate its feasibility, we present SEER (Secure and Efficient Encryption-based Erasure via Ransomware), a file destruction system that repurposes and reinforces the encryption core of Babuk ransomware. SEER incorporates key erasure, entropy validation, and execution consistency checks to ensure a well-constrained, auditable attack surface. Our evaluation shows that SEER achieves strong irrecoverability guarantees while maintaining practical performance. This work demonstrates a shift from abstract theoretical models toward practically verifiable implementation-layer security. |
| title | Beyond Algorithmic Proofs: Towards Implementation-Level Provable Security |
| topic | Cryptography and Security |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2508.01144 |