Saved in:
| Main Author: | |
|---|---|
| Format: | Preprint |
| Published: |
2025
|
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | https://arxiv.org/abs/2508.01662 |
| Tags: |
Add Tag
No Tags, Be the first to tag this record!
|
| _version_ | 1866909719281532928 |
|---|---|
| author | Ko, Hyeonggyun |
| author_facet | Ko, Hyeonggyun |
| contents | We study a long-run persuasion problem where a long-lived Sender repeatedly interacts with a sequence of short-lived Receivers who may adopt a misspecified model for belief updating. The Sender commits to a stationary information structure, but suspicious Receivers compare it to an uninformative alternative and may switch based on the Bayes factor rule. We characterize when the one-shot Bayesian Persuasion-optimal (BP-optimal) structure remains optimal in the long run despite this switching risk. In particular, when Receivers cannot infer the state from the Sender's preferred action, they never switch, and the BP-optimal structure maximizes the Sender's lifetime utility. In contrast, when such inference is possible, full disclosure may outperform BP-optimal. Our findings highlight the strategic challenges of information design when the Receivers' interpretation of signals evolves over time. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2508_01662 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2025 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Persuasion in the Long Run: When history matters Ko, Hyeonggyun Theoretical Economics We study a long-run persuasion problem where a long-lived Sender repeatedly interacts with a sequence of short-lived Receivers who may adopt a misspecified model for belief updating. The Sender commits to a stationary information structure, but suspicious Receivers compare it to an uninformative alternative and may switch based on the Bayes factor rule. We characterize when the one-shot Bayesian Persuasion-optimal (BP-optimal) structure remains optimal in the long run despite this switching risk. In particular, when Receivers cannot infer the state from the Sender's preferred action, they never switch, and the BP-optimal structure maximizes the Sender's lifetime utility. In contrast, when such inference is possible, full disclosure may outperform BP-optimal. Our findings highlight the strategic challenges of information design when the Receivers' interpretation of signals evolves over time. |
| title | Persuasion in the Long Run: When history matters |
| topic | Theoretical Economics |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2508.01662 |