Thwart Me If You Can: An Empirical Analysis of Android Platform Armoring Against Stalkerware
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arXiv
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| Format: | Preprint |
| Veröffentlicht: |
2025
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| author | Jadhav, Malvika Bao, Wenxuan Bindschaedler, Vincent |
| author_facet | Jadhav, Malvika Bao, Wenxuan Bindschaedler, Vincent |
| contents | Stalkerware is a serious threat to individuals' privacy that is receiving increased attention from the security and privacy research communities. Existing works have largely focused on studying leading stalkerware apps, dual-purpose apps, monetization of stalkerware, or the experience of survivors. However, there remains a need to understand potential defenses beyond the detection-and-removal approach, which may not necessarily be effective in the context of stalkerware.
In this paper, we perform a systematic analysis of a large corpus of recent Android stalkerware apps. We combine multiple analysis techniques to quantify stalkerware behaviors and capabilities and how these evolved over time. Our primary goal is understanding: how (and whether) recent Android platform changes -- largely designed to improve user privacy -- have thwarted stalkerware functionality; how stalkerware may have adapted as a result; and what we may conclude about potential defenses. Our investigation reveals new insights into tactics used by stalkerware and may inspire alternative defense strategies. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2508_02454 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2025 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Thwart Me If You Can: An Empirical Analysis of Android Platform Armoring Against Stalkerware Jadhav, Malvika Bao, Wenxuan Bindschaedler, Vincent Cryptography and Security Stalkerware is a serious threat to individuals' privacy that is receiving increased attention from the security and privacy research communities. Existing works have largely focused on studying leading stalkerware apps, dual-purpose apps, monetization of stalkerware, or the experience of survivors. However, there remains a need to understand potential defenses beyond the detection-and-removal approach, which may not necessarily be effective in the context of stalkerware. In this paper, we perform a systematic analysis of a large corpus of recent Android stalkerware apps. We combine multiple analysis techniques to quantify stalkerware behaviors and capabilities and how these evolved over time. Our primary goal is understanding: how (and whether) recent Android platform changes -- largely designed to improve user privacy -- have thwarted stalkerware functionality; how stalkerware may have adapted as a result; and what we may conclude about potential defenses. Our investigation reveals new insights into tactics used by stalkerware and may inspire alternative defense strategies. |
| title | Thwart Me If You Can: An Empirical Analysis of Android Platform Armoring Against Stalkerware |
| topic | Cryptography and Security |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2508.02454 |