Defending Against Knowledge Poisoning Attacks During Retrieval-Augmented Generation

Fuente: arXiv
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Hauptverfasser: Edemacu, Kennedy, Shashidhar, Vinay M., Tuape, Micheal, Abudu, Dan, Jang, Beakcheol, Kim, Jong Wook
Format: Preprint
Veröffentlicht: 2025
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author Edemacu, Kennedy
Shashidhar, Vinay M.
Tuape, Micheal
Abudu, Dan
Jang, Beakcheol
Kim, Jong Wook
author_facet Edemacu, Kennedy
Shashidhar, Vinay M.
Tuape, Micheal
Abudu, Dan
Jang, Beakcheol
Kim, Jong Wook
contents Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) has emerged as a powerful approach to boost the capabilities of large language models (LLMs) by incorporating external, up-to-date knowledge sources. However, this introduces a potential vulnerability to knowledge poisoning attacks, where attackers can compromise the knowledge source to mislead the generation model. One such attack is the PoisonedRAG in which the injected adversarial texts steer the model to generate an attacker-chosen response to a target question. In this work, we propose novel defense methods, FilterRAG and ML-FilterRAG, to mitigate the PoisonedRAG attack. First, we propose a new property to uncover distinct properties to differentiate between adversarial and clean texts in the knowledge data source. Next, we employ this property to filter out adversarial texts from clean ones in the design of our proposed approaches. Evaluation of these methods using benchmark datasets demonstrate their effectiveness, with performances close to those of the original RAG systems.
format Preprint
id arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2508_02835
institution arXiv
publishDate 2025
record_format arxiv
spellingShingle Defending Against Knowledge Poisoning Attacks During Retrieval-Augmented Generation
Edemacu, Kennedy
Shashidhar, Vinay M.
Tuape, Micheal
Abudu, Dan
Jang, Beakcheol
Kim, Jong Wook
Machine Learning
Information Retrieval
Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) has emerged as a powerful approach to boost the capabilities of large language models (LLMs) by incorporating external, up-to-date knowledge sources. However, this introduces a potential vulnerability to knowledge poisoning attacks, where attackers can compromise the knowledge source to mislead the generation model. One such attack is the PoisonedRAG in which the injected adversarial texts steer the model to generate an attacker-chosen response to a target question. In this work, we propose novel defense methods, FilterRAG and ML-FilterRAG, to mitigate the PoisonedRAG attack. First, we propose a new property to uncover distinct properties to differentiate between adversarial and clean texts in the knowledge data source. Next, we employ this property to filter out adversarial texts from clean ones in the design of our proposed approaches. Evaluation of these methods using benchmark datasets demonstrate their effectiveness, with performances close to those of the original RAG systems.
title Defending Against Knowledge Poisoning Attacks During Retrieval-Augmented Generation
topic Machine Learning
Information Retrieval
url https://arxiv.org/abs/2508.02835