Saved in:
| Main Authors: | , , |
|---|---|
| Format: | Preprint |
| Published: |
2025
|
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | https://arxiv.org/abs/2508.03289 |
| Tags: |
Add Tag
No Tags, Be the first to tag this record!
|
| _version_ | 1866911093095399424 |
|---|---|
| author | Hossain, Safwan Chen, Yatong Chen, Yiling |
| author_facet | Hossain, Safwan Chen, Yatong Chen, Yiling |
| contents | We examine hypothesis testing within a principal-agent framework, where a strategic agent, holding private beliefs about the effectiveness of a product, submits data to a principal who decides on approval. The principal employs a hypothesis testing rule, aiming to pick a p-value threshold that balances false positives and false negatives while anticipating the agent's incentive to maximize expected profitability. Building on prior work, we develop a game-theoretic model that captures how the agent's participation and reporting behavior respond to the principal's statistical decision rule. Despite the complexity of the interaction, we show that the principal's errors exhibit clear monotonic behavior when segmented by an efficiently computable critical p-value threshold, leading to an interpretable characterization of their optimal p-value threshold. We empirically validate our model and these insights using publicly available data on drug approvals. Overall, our work offers a comprehensive perspective on strategic interactions within the hypothesis testing framework, providing technical and regulatory insights. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2508_03289 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2025 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Strategic Hypothesis Testing Hossain, Safwan Chen, Yatong Chen, Yiling Machine Learning We examine hypothesis testing within a principal-agent framework, where a strategic agent, holding private beliefs about the effectiveness of a product, submits data to a principal who decides on approval. The principal employs a hypothesis testing rule, aiming to pick a p-value threshold that balances false positives and false negatives while anticipating the agent's incentive to maximize expected profitability. Building on prior work, we develop a game-theoretic model that captures how the agent's participation and reporting behavior respond to the principal's statistical decision rule. Despite the complexity of the interaction, we show that the principal's errors exhibit clear monotonic behavior when segmented by an efficiently computable critical p-value threshold, leading to an interpretable characterization of their optimal p-value threshold. We empirically validate our model and these insights using publicly available data on drug approvals. Overall, our work offers a comprehensive perspective on strategic interactions within the hypothesis testing framework, providing technical and regulatory insights. |
| title | Strategic Hypothesis Testing |
| topic | Machine Learning |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2508.03289 |