Mechanism Design for Facility Location using Predictions
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arXiv
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| Format: | Preprint |
| Veröffentlicht: |
2025
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| _version_ | 1866913976959369216 |
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| author | Walsh, Toby |
| author_facet | Walsh, Toby |
| contents | We study mechanisms for the facility location problem augmented with predictions of the optimal facility location. We demonstrate that an egalitarian viewpoint which considers both the maximum distance of any agent from the facility and the minimum utility of any agent provides important new insights compared to a viewpoint that just considers the maximum distance. As in previous studies, we consider performance in terms of consistency (worst case when predictions are accurate) and robustness (worst case irrespective of the accuracy of predictions). By considering how mechanisms with predictions can perform poorly, we design new mechanisms that are more robust. Indeed, by adjusting parameters, we demonstrate how to trade robustness for consistency. We go beyond the single facility problem by designing novel strategy proof mechanisms for locating two facilities with bounded consistency and robustness that use two predictions for where to locate the two facilities. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2508_03818 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2025 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Mechanism Design for Facility Location using Predictions Walsh, Toby Computer Science and Game Theory Artificial Intelligence We study mechanisms for the facility location problem augmented with predictions of the optimal facility location. We demonstrate that an egalitarian viewpoint which considers both the maximum distance of any agent from the facility and the minimum utility of any agent provides important new insights compared to a viewpoint that just considers the maximum distance. As in previous studies, we consider performance in terms of consistency (worst case when predictions are accurate) and robustness (worst case irrespective of the accuracy of predictions). By considering how mechanisms with predictions can perform poorly, we design new mechanisms that are more robust. Indeed, by adjusting parameters, we demonstrate how to trade robustness for consistency. We go beyond the single facility problem by designing novel strategy proof mechanisms for locating two facilities with bounded consistency and robustness that use two predictions for where to locate the two facilities. |
| title | Mechanism Design for Facility Location using Predictions |
| topic | Computer Science and Game Theory Artificial Intelligence |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2508.03818 |