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Mechanism Design for Facility Location using Predictions

Fuente: arXiv

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author:	Walsh, Toby
Format:	Preprint
Published:	2025
Subjects:	Computer Science and Game Theory Artificial Intelligence
Online Access:	Acceder al recurso
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