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| Main Authors: | , , |
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| Format: | Preprint |
| Published: |
2025
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| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | https://arxiv.org/abs/2508.04265 |
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| _version_ | 1866913977591660544 |
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| author | Li, Borui Yan, Li Liu, Jianmin |
| author_facet | Li, Borui Yan, Li Liu, Jianmin |
| contents | Federated Learning (FL) enables collaborative model training on decentralized data but remains vulnerable to gradient leakage attacks that can reconstruct sensitive user information. Existing defense mechanisms, such as differential privacy (DP) and homomorphic encryption (HE), often introduce a trade-off between privacy, model utility, and system overhead, a challenge that is exacerbated in heterogeneous environments with non-IID data and varying client capabilities. To address these limitations, we propose SelectiveShield, a lightweight hybrid defense framework that adaptively integrates selective homomorphic encryption and differential privacy. SelectiveShield leverages Fisher information to quantify parameter sensitivity, allowing clients to identify critical parameters locally. Through a collaborative negotiation protocol, clients agree on a shared set of the most sensitive parameters for protection via homomorphic encryption. Parameters that are uniquely important to individual clients are retained locally, fostering personalization, while non-critical parameters are protected with adaptive differential privacy noise. Extensive experiments demonstrate that SelectiveShield maintains strong model utility while significantly mitigating gradient leakage risks, offering a practical and scalable defense mechanism for real-world federated learning deployments. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2508_04265 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2025 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | SelectiveShield: Lightweight Hybrid Defense Against Gradient Leakage in Federated Learning Li, Borui Yan, Li Liu, Jianmin Distributed, Parallel, and Cluster Computing Artificial Intelligence Cryptography and Security Federated Learning (FL) enables collaborative model training on decentralized data but remains vulnerable to gradient leakage attacks that can reconstruct sensitive user information. Existing defense mechanisms, such as differential privacy (DP) and homomorphic encryption (HE), often introduce a trade-off between privacy, model utility, and system overhead, a challenge that is exacerbated in heterogeneous environments with non-IID data and varying client capabilities. To address these limitations, we propose SelectiveShield, a lightweight hybrid defense framework that adaptively integrates selective homomorphic encryption and differential privacy. SelectiveShield leverages Fisher information to quantify parameter sensitivity, allowing clients to identify critical parameters locally. Through a collaborative negotiation protocol, clients agree on a shared set of the most sensitive parameters for protection via homomorphic encryption. Parameters that are uniquely important to individual clients are retained locally, fostering personalization, while non-critical parameters are protected with adaptive differential privacy noise. Extensive experiments demonstrate that SelectiveShield maintains strong model utility while significantly mitigating gradient leakage risks, offering a practical and scalable defense mechanism for real-world federated learning deployments. |
| title | SelectiveShield: Lightweight Hybrid Defense Against Gradient Leakage in Federated Learning |
| topic | Distributed, Parallel, and Cluster Computing Artificial Intelligence Cryptography and Security |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2508.04265 |