Artificial Consciousness as Interface Representation

Fuente: arXiv
Saved in:
Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Prentner, Robert
Format: Preprint
Published: 2025
Subjects:
Online Access:
Tags: Add Tag
No Tags, Be the first to tag this record!
_version_ 1866911094544531456
author Prentner, Robert
author_facet Prentner, Robert
contents Whether artificial intelligence (AI) systems can possess consciousness is a contentious question because of the inherent challenges of defining and operationalizing subjective experience. This paper proposes a framework to reframe the question of artificial consciousness into empirically tractable tests. We introduce three evaluative criteria - S (subjective-linguistic), L (latent-emergent), and P (phenomenological-structural) - collectively termed SLP-tests, which assess whether an AI system instantiates interface representations that facilitate consciousness-like properties. Drawing on category theory, we model interface representations as mappings between relational substrates (RS) and observable behaviors, akin to specific types of abstraction layers. The SLP-tests collectively operationalize subjective experience not as an intrinsic property of physical systems but as a functional interface to a relational entity.
format Preprint
id arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2508_04383
institution arXiv
publishDate 2025
record_format arxiv
spellingShingle Artificial Consciousness as Interface Representation
Prentner, Robert
Artificial Intelligence
Neurons and Cognition
Whether artificial intelligence (AI) systems can possess consciousness is a contentious question because of the inherent challenges of defining and operationalizing subjective experience. This paper proposes a framework to reframe the question of artificial consciousness into empirically tractable tests. We introduce three evaluative criteria - S (subjective-linguistic), L (latent-emergent), and P (phenomenological-structural) - collectively termed SLP-tests, which assess whether an AI system instantiates interface representations that facilitate consciousness-like properties. Drawing on category theory, we model interface representations as mappings between relational substrates (RS) and observable behaviors, akin to specific types of abstraction layers. The SLP-tests collectively operationalize subjective experience not as an intrinsic property of physical systems but as a functional interface to a relational entity.
title Artificial Consciousness as Interface Representation
topic Artificial Intelligence
Neurons and Cognition
url https://arxiv.org/abs/2508.04383