Pairwise efficiency and monotonicity imply Pareto efficiency in (probabilistic) object allocation
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arXiv
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| Hauptverfasser: | , |
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| Format: | Preprint |
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2025
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| _version_ | 1866908481088389120 |
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| author | Demeulemeester, Tom Klaus, Bettina |
| author_facet | Demeulemeester, Tom Klaus, Bettina |
| contents | We consider object allocation problems with capacities (see, e.g., Abdulkadiroglu and Sonmez, 1998; Basteck, 2025) where objects have to be assigned to agents. We show that if a lottery rule satisfies ex-post non-wastefulness and probabilistic (Maskin) monotonicity, then ex-post pairwise efficiency is equivalent to ex-post Pareto efficiency. This result allows for a strengthening of various existing characterization results, both for lottery rules and deterministic rules, by replacing (ex-post) Pareto efficiency with (ex-post) pairwise efficiency, e.g., for characterizations of the Random Serial Dictatorship rule (Basteck, 2025), Trading Cycles rules (Pycia and Unver, 2017), and Hierarchical Exchange rules (Papai, 2000). |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2508_05340 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2025 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Pairwise efficiency and monotonicity imply Pareto efficiency in (probabilistic) object allocation Demeulemeester, Tom Klaus, Bettina Theoretical Economics Computer Science and Game Theory We consider object allocation problems with capacities (see, e.g., Abdulkadiroglu and Sonmez, 1998; Basteck, 2025) where objects have to be assigned to agents. We show that if a lottery rule satisfies ex-post non-wastefulness and probabilistic (Maskin) monotonicity, then ex-post pairwise efficiency is equivalent to ex-post Pareto efficiency. This result allows for a strengthening of various existing characterization results, both for lottery rules and deterministic rules, by replacing (ex-post) Pareto efficiency with (ex-post) pairwise efficiency, e.g., for characterizations of the Random Serial Dictatorship rule (Basteck, 2025), Trading Cycles rules (Pycia and Unver, 2017), and Hierarchical Exchange rules (Papai, 2000). |
| title | Pairwise efficiency and monotonicity imply Pareto efficiency in (probabilistic) object allocation |
| topic | Theoretical Economics Computer Science and Game Theory |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2508.05340 |