Voltage Support Procurement in Transmission Grids: Incentive Design via Online Bilevel Games
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| Main Authors: | , , |
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| Format: | Preprint |
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2025
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| _version_ | 1866912532779761664 |
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| author | Jiang, Zhisen Bolognani, Saverio Belgioioso, Giuseppe |
| author_facet | Jiang, Zhisen Bolognani, Saverio Belgioioso, Giuseppe |
| contents | The integration of distributed energy resources into transmission grid operations presents a complex challenge, particularly in the context of reactive power procurement for voltage support. This paper addresses this challenge by formulating the voltage regulation problem as a Stackelberg game, where the Transmission System Operator (TSO) designs incentives to guide the reactive power responses of Distribution System Operators (DSOs). We utilize a gradient-based iterative algorithm that updates the incentives to ensure that DSOs adjust their reactive power injections to maintain voltage stability. We incorporate principles from online feedback optimization to enable real-time implementation, utilizing voltage measurements in both TSO's and DSOs' policies. This approach not only enhances the robustness against model uncertainties and changing operating conditions but also facilitates the co-design of incentives and automation. Numerical experiments on a 5-bus transmission grid demonstrate the effectiveness of our approach in achieving voltage regulation while accommodating the strategic interactions of self-interested DSOs. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2508_05378 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2025 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Voltage Support Procurement in Transmission Grids: Incentive Design via Online Bilevel Games Jiang, Zhisen Bolognani, Saverio Belgioioso, Giuseppe Optimization and Control The integration of distributed energy resources into transmission grid operations presents a complex challenge, particularly in the context of reactive power procurement for voltage support. This paper addresses this challenge by formulating the voltage regulation problem as a Stackelberg game, where the Transmission System Operator (TSO) designs incentives to guide the reactive power responses of Distribution System Operators (DSOs). We utilize a gradient-based iterative algorithm that updates the incentives to ensure that DSOs adjust their reactive power injections to maintain voltage stability. We incorporate principles from online feedback optimization to enable real-time implementation, utilizing voltage measurements in both TSO's and DSOs' policies. This approach not only enhances the robustness against model uncertainties and changing operating conditions but also facilitates the co-design of incentives and automation. Numerical experiments on a 5-bus transmission grid demonstrate the effectiveness of our approach in achieving voltage regulation while accommodating the strategic interactions of self-interested DSOs. |
| title | Voltage Support Procurement in Transmission Grids: Incentive Design via Online Bilevel Games |
| topic | Optimization and Control |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2508.05378 |