DMFI: A Dual-Modality Log Analysis Framework for Insider Threat Detection with LoRA-Tuned Language Models

Fuente: arXiv
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Auteurs principaux: Kong, Kaichuan, Liu, Dongjie, Jin, Xiaobo, Geng, Guanggang, Li, Zhiying, Weng, Jian
Format: Preprint
Publié: 2025
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author Kong, Kaichuan
Liu, Dongjie
Jin, Xiaobo
Geng, Guanggang
Li, Zhiying
Weng, Jian
author_facet Kong, Kaichuan
Liu, Dongjie
Jin, Xiaobo
Geng, Guanggang
Li, Zhiying
Weng, Jian
contents Insider threat detection (ITD) poses a persistent and high-impact challenge in cybersecurity due to the subtle, long-term, and context-dependent nature of malicious insider behaviors. Traditional models often struggle to capture semantic intent and complex behavior dynamics, while existing LLM-based solutions face limitations in prompt adaptability and modality coverage. To bridge this gap, we propose DMFI, a dual-modality framework that integrates semantic inference with behavior-aware fine-tuning. DMFI converts raw logs into two structured views: (1) a semantic view that processes content-rich artifacts (e.g., emails, https) using instruction-formatted prompts; and (2) a behavioral abstraction, constructed via a 4W-guided (When-Where-What-Which) transformation to encode contextual action sequences. Two LoRA-enhanced LLMs are fine-tuned independently, and their outputs are fused via a lightweight MLP-based decision module. We further introduce DMFI-B, a discriminative adaptation strategy that separates normal and abnormal behavior representations, improving robustness under severe class imbalance. Experiments on CERT r4.2 and r5.2 datasets demonstrate that DMFI outperforms state-of-the-art methods in detection accuracy. Our approach combines the semantic reasoning power of LLMs with structured behavior modeling, offering a scalable and effective solution for real-world insider threat detection.
format Preprint
id arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2508_05694
institution arXiv
publishDate 2025
record_format arxiv
spellingShingle DMFI: A Dual-Modality Log Analysis Framework for Insider Threat Detection with LoRA-Tuned Language Models
Kong, Kaichuan
Liu, Dongjie
Jin, Xiaobo
Geng, Guanggang
Li, Zhiying
Weng, Jian
Cryptography and Security
Artificial Intelligence
Computation and Language
Insider threat detection (ITD) poses a persistent and high-impact challenge in cybersecurity due to the subtle, long-term, and context-dependent nature of malicious insider behaviors. Traditional models often struggle to capture semantic intent and complex behavior dynamics, while existing LLM-based solutions face limitations in prompt adaptability and modality coverage. To bridge this gap, we propose DMFI, a dual-modality framework that integrates semantic inference with behavior-aware fine-tuning. DMFI converts raw logs into two structured views: (1) a semantic view that processes content-rich artifacts (e.g., emails, https) using instruction-formatted prompts; and (2) a behavioral abstraction, constructed via a 4W-guided (When-Where-What-Which) transformation to encode contextual action sequences. Two LoRA-enhanced LLMs are fine-tuned independently, and their outputs are fused via a lightweight MLP-based decision module. We further introduce DMFI-B, a discriminative adaptation strategy that separates normal and abnormal behavior representations, improving robustness under severe class imbalance. Experiments on CERT r4.2 and r5.2 datasets demonstrate that DMFI outperforms state-of-the-art methods in detection accuracy. Our approach combines the semantic reasoning power of LLMs with structured behavior modeling, offering a scalable and effective solution for real-world insider threat detection.
title DMFI: A Dual-Modality Log Analysis Framework for Insider Threat Detection with LoRA-Tuned Language Models
topic Cryptography and Security
Artificial Intelligence
Computation and Language
url https://arxiv.org/abs/2508.05694