Inter-role reciprocity in evolutionary trust game on square lattices

Fuente: arXiv
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Autores principales: Wang, Chaoqian, Zhang, Wei, Wang, Xinwei, Szolnoki, Attila
Formato: Preprint
Publicado: 2025
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author Wang, Chaoqian
Zhang, Wei
Wang, Xinwei
Szolnoki, Attila
author_facet Wang, Chaoqian
Zhang, Wei
Wang, Xinwei
Szolnoki, Attila
contents Simulating bipartite games, such as the trust game, is not straightforward due to the lack of a natural way to distinguish roles in a single population. The square lattice topology can provide a simple yet elegant solution by alternating trustors and trustees. For even lattice sizes, it creates two disjoint diagonal sub-lattices for strategy learning, while game interactions can take place on the original lattice. This setup ensures a minimal spatial structure that allows interactions across roles and learning within roles. By simulations on this setup, we detect an inter-role spatial reciprocity mechanism, through which trust can emerge. In particular, a moderate return ratio allows investing trustors and trustworthy trustees to form inter-role clusters and thus save trust. If the return is too high, it harms the survival of trustees; if too low, it harms trustors. The proposed simulation framework is also applicable to any bipartite game to uncover potential inter-role spatial mechanisms across various scenarios.
format Preprint
id arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2508_06685
institution arXiv
publishDate 2025
record_format arxiv
spellingShingle Inter-role reciprocity in evolutionary trust game on square lattices
Wang, Chaoqian
Zhang, Wei
Wang, Xinwei
Szolnoki, Attila
Physics and Society
Computer Science and Game Theory
Cellular Automata and Lattice Gases
Simulating bipartite games, such as the trust game, is not straightforward due to the lack of a natural way to distinguish roles in a single population. The square lattice topology can provide a simple yet elegant solution by alternating trustors and trustees. For even lattice sizes, it creates two disjoint diagonal sub-lattices for strategy learning, while game interactions can take place on the original lattice. This setup ensures a minimal spatial structure that allows interactions across roles and learning within roles. By simulations on this setup, we detect an inter-role spatial reciprocity mechanism, through which trust can emerge. In particular, a moderate return ratio allows investing trustors and trustworthy trustees to form inter-role clusters and thus save trust. If the return is too high, it harms the survival of trustees; if too low, it harms trustors. The proposed simulation framework is also applicable to any bipartite game to uncover potential inter-role spatial mechanisms across various scenarios.
title Inter-role reciprocity in evolutionary trust game on square lattices
topic Physics and Society
Computer Science and Game Theory
Cellular Automata and Lattice Gases
url https://arxiv.org/abs/2508.06685