False Reality: Uncovering Sensor-induced Human-VR Interaction Vulnerability
Fuente:
arXiv
Salvato in:
| Autori principali: | , , , , , |
|---|---|
| Natura: | Preprint |
| Pubblicazione: |
2025
|
| Soggetti: | |
| Accesso online: | |
| Tags: |
Aggiungi Tag
Nessun Tag, puoi essere il primo ad aggiungerne!!
|
| _version_ | 1866911714808692736 |
|---|---|
| author | Jiang, Yancheng Jiang, Yan Zhou, Ruochen Chen, Yi-Chao Ji, Xiaoyu Xu, Wenyuan |
| author_facet | Jiang, Yancheng Jiang, Yan Zhou, Ruochen Chen, Yi-Chao Ji, Xiaoyu Xu, Wenyuan |
| contents | Virtual Reality (VR) techniques, serving as the bridge between the real and virtual worlds, have boomed and are widely used in manufacturing, remote healthcare, gaming, etc. Specifically, VR systems offer users immersive experiences that include both perceptions and actions. Various studies have demonstrated that attackers can manipulate VR software to influence users' interactions, including perception and actions. However, such attacks typically require strong access and specialized expertise. In this paper, we are the first to present a systematic analysis of physical attacks against VR systems and introduce False Reality, a new attack threat to VR devices without requiring access to or modification of their software. False Reality disturbs VR system services by tampering with sensor measurements, and further spoofing users' perception even inducing harmful actions, e.g., inducing dizziness or causing users to crash into obstacles, by exploiting perceptual and psychological effects. We formalize these threats through an attack pathway framework and validate three representative pathways via physical experiments and user studies on five commercial VR devices. Finally, we further propose a defense prototype to mitigate such threats. Our findings shall provide valuable insights for enhancing the security and resilience of future VR systems. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2508_08043 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2025 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | False Reality: Uncovering Sensor-induced Human-VR Interaction Vulnerability Jiang, Yancheng Jiang, Yan Zhou, Ruochen Chen, Yi-Chao Ji, Xiaoyu Xu, Wenyuan Cryptography and Security Human-Computer Interaction Virtual Reality (VR) techniques, serving as the bridge between the real and virtual worlds, have boomed and are widely used in manufacturing, remote healthcare, gaming, etc. Specifically, VR systems offer users immersive experiences that include both perceptions and actions. Various studies have demonstrated that attackers can manipulate VR software to influence users' interactions, including perception and actions. However, such attacks typically require strong access and specialized expertise. In this paper, we are the first to present a systematic analysis of physical attacks against VR systems and introduce False Reality, a new attack threat to VR devices without requiring access to or modification of their software. False Reality disturbs VR system services by tampering with sensor measurements, and further spoofing users' perception even inducing harmful actions, e.g., inducing dizziness or causing users to crash into obstacles, by exploiting perceptual and psychological effects. We formalize these threats through an attack pathway framework and validate three representative pathways via physical experiments and user studies on five commercial VR devices. Finally, we further propose a defense prototype to mitigate such threats. Our findings shall provide valuable insights for enhancing the security and resilience of future VR systems. |
| title | False Reality: Uncovering Sensor-induced Human-VR Interaction Vulnerability |
| topic | Cryptography and Security Human-Computer Interaction |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2508.08043 |