Coordinating cooperation in stag-hunt game: Emergence of evolutionarily stable procedural rationality
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arXiv
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| Natura: | Preprint |
| Pubblicazione: |
2025
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| _version_ | 1866908484855922688 |
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| author | Bairagya, Joy Das Chakraborty, Sagar |
| author_facet | Bairagya, Joy Das Chakraborty, Sagar |
| contents | Humans are bounded rational at best and this, we argue, has worked in their favour in the hunter-gatherer society where emergence of a coordinated action, leading to cooperation, is otherwise the standard stag-hunt dilemma (when individuals are rational). In line with the fact the humans strive for developing self-reputation by having less propensity to cheat than to be cheated, we observe that the payoff structure of the stag-hunt game appropriately modifies to that of coordination-II game. Subsequently, within the paradigm of evolutionary game theory, we establish that a population -- consisting of procedural rational players (a type of bounded rationality) -- is unequivocally evolutionarily stable against emergence of more rational strategies in coordination-II game. The cooperation is, thus, shown to have been established by evolutionary forces picking less rational individuals. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2508_08301 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2025 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Coordinating cooperation in stag-hunt game: Emergence of evolutionarily stable procedural rationality Bairagya, Joy Das Chakraborty, Sagar Physics and Society Theoretical Economics Adaptation and Self-Organizing Systems Biological Physics Populations and Evolution Humans are bounded rational at best and this, we argue, has worked in their favour in the hunter-gatherer society where emergence of a coordinated action, leading to cooperation, is otherwise the standard stag-hunt dilemma (when individuals are rational). In line with the fact the humans strive for developing self-reputation by having less propensity to cheat than to be cheated, we observe that the payoff structure of the stag-hunt game appropriately modifies to that of coordination-II game. Subsequently, within the paradigm of evolutionary game theory, we establish that a population -- consisting of procedural rational players (a type of bounded rationality) -- is unequivocally evolutionarily stable against emergence of more rational strategies in coordination-II game. The cooperation is, thus, shown to have been established by evolutionary forces picking less rational individuals. |
| title | Coordinating cooperation in stag-hunt game: Emergence of evolutionarily stable procedural rationality |
| topic | Physics and Society Theoretical Economics Adaptation and Self-Organizing Systems Biological Physics Populations and Evolution |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2508.08301 |