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Optimal Boost Design for Auto-bidding Mechanism with Publisher Quality Constraints

Fuente: arXiv

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Detalles Bibliográficos
Autores principales:	Yan, Huanyu, Huo, Yu, Lu, Min, Ou, Weitong, Shi, Xingyan, Shi, Ruihe, Tang, Xiaoying
Formato:	Preprint
Publicado:	2025
Materias:	Computer Science and Game Theory
Acceso en línea:	Acceder al recurso
Etiquetas:	Agregar Etiqueta Sin Etiquetas, Sea el primero en etiquetar este registro!

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