Dividing a cake for the irrationally entitled
Fuente:
arXiv
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| Autores principales: | , |
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| Formato: | Preprint |
| Publicado: |
2025
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| Materias: | |
| Acceso en línea: | |
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| _version_ | 1866911102926848000 |
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| author | Brandl, Florian Mackenzie, Andrew |
| author_facet | Brandl, Florian Mackenzie, Andrew |
| contents | A perfectly divisible cake is to be divided among a group of agents. Each agent is entitled to a share between zero and one, and these entitlements are compatible in that they sum to one. The mediator does not know the preferences of the agents, but can query the agents to make cuts and appraise slices in order to learn. We prove that if one of the entitlements is irrational, then the mediator must use a protocol that involves an arbitrarily large number of queries in order to construct an allocation that respects the entitlements regardless of preferences. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2508_09004 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2025 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Dividing a cake for the irrationally entitled Brandl, Florian Mackenzie, Andrew Theoretical Economics Computer Science and Game Theory A perfectly divisible cake is to be divided among a group of agents. Each agent is entitled to a share between zero and one, and these entitlements are compatible in that they sum to one. The mediator does not know the preferences of the agents, but can query the agents to make cuts and appraise slices in order to learn. We prove that if one of the entitlements is irrational, then the mediator must use a protocol that involves an arbitrarily large number of queries in order to construct an allocation that respects the entitlements regardless of preferences. |
| title | Dividing a cake for the irrationally entitled |
| topic | Theoretical Economics Computer Science and Game Theory |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2508.09004 |