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| Main Authors: | , |
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| Format: | Preprint |
| Published: |
2025
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| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | https://arxiv.org/abs/2508.09046 |
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| _version_ | 1866911415568171008 |
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| author | Zeitlin, Joshua Coupette, Corinna |
| author_facet | Zeitlin, Joshua Coupette, Corinna |
| contents | Whether the goal is to analyze voting behavior, locate facilities, or recommend products, the problem of translating between (ordinal) rankings and (numerical) utilities arises naturally in many contexts. This task is commonly approached by representing both the individuals doing the ranking (voters) and the items to be ranked (alternatives) in a shared metric space, where ordinal preferences are translated into relationships between pairwise distances. Prior work has established that any collection of rankings with $n$ voters and $m$ alternatives (preference profile) can be embedded into $d$-dimensional Euclidean space for $d \geq \min\{n,m-1\}$ under the Euclidean norm and the Manhattan norm. We show that this holds for all $p$-norms and establish that any pair of rankings can be embedded into $R^2$ under arbitrary norms, significantly expanding the reach of spatial preference models. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2508_09046 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2025 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Real Preferences Under Arbitrary Norms Zeitlin, Joshua Coupette, Corinna Theoretical Economics Whether the goal is to analyze voting behavior, locate facilities, or recommend products, the problem of translating between (ordinal) rankings and (numerical) utilities arises naturally in many contexts. This task is commonly approached by representing both the individuals doing the ranking (voters) and the items to be ranked (alternatives) in a shared metric space, where ordinal preferences are translated into relationships between pairwise distances. Prior work has established that any collection of rankings with $n$ voters and $m$ alternatives (preference profile) can be embedded into $d$-dimensional Euclidean space for $d \geq \min\{n,m-1\}$ under the Euclidean norm and the Manhattan norm. We show that this holds for all $p$-norms and establish that any pair of rankings can be embedded into $R^2$ under arbitrary norms, significantly expanding the reach of spatial preference models. |
| title | Real Preferences Under Arbitrary Norms |
| topic | Theoretical Economics |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2508.09046 |