Long-Term Client Selection for Federated Learning with Non-IID Data: A Truthful Auction Approach
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arXiv
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| Hauptverfasser: | , , , |
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| Format: | Preprint |
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2025
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| _version_ | 1866911103368298496 |
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| author | Tan, Jinghong Liu, Zhian Guo, Kun Zhao, Mingxiong |
| author_facet | Tan, Jinghong Liu, Zhian Guo, Kun Zhao, Mingxiong |
| contents | Federated learning (FL) provides a decentralized framework that enables universal model training through collaborative efforts on mobile nodes, such as smart vehicles in the Internet of Vehicles (IoV). Each smart vehicle acts as a mobile client, contributing to the process without uploading local data. This method leverages non-independent and identically distributed (non-IID) training data from different vehicles, influenced by various driving patterns and environmental conditions, which can significantly impact model convergence and accuracy. Although client selection can be a feasible solution for non-IID issues, it faces challenges related to selection metrics. Traditional metrics evaluate client data quality independently per round and require client selection after all clients complete local training, leading to resource wastage from unused training results. In the IoV context, where vehicles have limited connectivity and computational resources, information asymmetry in client selection risks clients submitting false information, potentially making the selection ineffective. To tackle these challenges, we propose a novel Long-term Client-Selection Federated Learning based on Truthful Auction (LCSFLA). This scheme maximizes social welfare with consideration of long-term data quality using a new assessment mechanism and energy costs, and the advised auction mechanism with a deposit requirement incentivizes client participation and ensures information truthfulness. We theoretically prove the incentive compatibility and individual rationality of the advised incentive mechanism. Experimental results on various datasets, including those from IoV scenarios, demonstrate its effectiveness in mitigating performance degradation caused by non-IID data. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2508_09181 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2025 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Long-Term Client Selection for Federated Learning with Non-IID Data: A Truthful Auction Approach Tan, Jinghong Liu, Zhian Guo, Kun Zhao, Mingxiong Machine Learning Artificial Intelligence Systems and Control Federated learning (FL) provides a decentralized framework that enables universal model training through collaborative efforts on mobile nodes, such as smart vehicles in the Internet of Vehicles (IoV). Each smart vehicle acts as a mobile client, contributing to the process without uploading local data. This method leverages non-independent and identically distributed (non-IID) training data from different vehicles, influenced by various driving patterns and environmental conditions, which can significantly impact model convergence and accuracy. Although client selection can be a feasible solution for non-IID issues, it faces challenges related to selection metrics. Traditional metrics evaluate client data quality independently per round and require client selection after all clients complete local training, leading to resource wastage from unused training results. In the IoV context, where vehicles have limited connectivity and computational resources, information asymmetry in client selection risks clients submitting false information, potentially making the selection ineffective. To tackle these challenges, we propose a novel Long-term Client-Selection Federated Learning based on Truthful Auction (LCSFLA). This scheme maximizes social welfare with consideration of long-term data quality using a new assessment mechanism and energy costs, and the advised auction mechanism with a deposit requirement incentivizes client participation and ensures information truthfulness. We theoretically prove the incentive compatibility and individual rationality of the advised incentive mechanism. Experimental results on various datasets, including those from IoV scenarios, demonstrate its effectiveness in mitigating performance degradation caused by non-IID data. |
| title | Long-Term Client Selection for Federated Learning with Non-IID Data: A Truthful Auction Approach |
| topic | Machine Learning Artificial Intelligence Systems and Control |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2508.09181 |