Swap Bounded Envy
Fuente:
arXiv
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| Autori principali: | , , |
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| Natura: | Preprint |
| Pubblicazione: |
2025
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| _version_ | 1866918124287164416 |
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| author | Echenique, Federico Goel, Sumit Lee, SangMok |
| author_facet | Echenique, Federico Goel, Sumit Lee, SangMok |
| contents | We study fairness in the allocation of discrete goods. Exactly fair (envy-free) allocations are impossible, so we discuss notions of approximate fairness. In particular, we focus on allocations in which the swap of two items serves to eliminate any envy, either for the allocated bundles or with respect to a reference bundle. We propose an algorithm that, under some restrictions on agents' preferences, achieves an allocation with ``swap bounded envy.'' |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2508_09290 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2025 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Swap Bounded Envy Echenique, Federico Goel, Sumit Lee, SangMok Theoretical Economics Computer Science and Game Theory We study fairness in the allocation of discrete goods. Exactly fair (envy-free) allocations are impossible, so we discuss notions of approximate fairness. In particular, we focus on allocations in which the swap of two items serves to eliminate any envy, either for the allocated bundles or with respect to a reference bundle. We propose an algorithm that, under some restrictions on agents' preferences, achieves an allocation with ``swap bounded envy.'' |
| title | Swap Bounded Envy |
| topic | Theoretical Economics Computer Science and Game Theory |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2508.09290 |