The asymmetrical Acquisition of information about the range of asset value in market

Fuente: arXiv
Enregistré dans:
Détails bibliographiques
Auteurs principaux: Su, Jianhao, Zhang, Yanliang
Format: Preprint
Publié: 2025
Sujets:
Accès en ligne:
Tags: Ajouter un tag
Pas de tags, Soyez le premier à ajouter un tag!
_version_ 1866908487753138176
author Su, Jianhao
Zhang, Yanliang
author_facet Su, Jianhao
Zhang, Yanliang
contents The information investors acquire in asset markets has various forms. We refer to range information as information about the upper and lower bound which the payoff of an asset may reach in the future. This paper explores the market impacts of investors' asymmetrical acquisition of range information. Uninformed traders are inherently unable to directly obtain the private signal held by informed traders. This study shows that when range information is released to investors asymmetrically, uninformed traders who can only obtain rougher range information will not trade assets under the max-min ambiguity aversion criterion. Investors' asymmetrical acquisition of range information can cause that market liquidity and the sensitivity of market price to private signal vary continuously with the signal and noise trading volume. We also reveal that investors' asymmetrical acquisition of range information can increase market liquidity and the sensitivity of price under some conditions and decrease them under some other conditions.
format Preprint
id arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2508_09615
institution arXiv
publishDate 2025
record_format arxiv
spellingShingle The asymmetrical Acquisition of information about the range of asset value in market
Su, Jianhao
Zhang, Yanliang
Theoretical Economics
The information investors acquire in asset markets has various forms. We refer to range information as information about the upper and lower bound which the payoff of an asset may reach in the future. This paper explores the market impacts of investors' asymmetrical acquisition of range information. Uninformed traders are inherently unable to directly obtain the private signal held by informed traders. This study shows that when range information is released to investors asymmetrically, uninformed traders who can only obtain rougher range information will not trade assets under the max-min ambiguity aversion criterion. Investors' asymmetrical acquisition of range information can cause that market liquidity and the sensitivity of market price to private signal vary continuously with the signal and noise trading volume. We also reveal that investors' asymmetrical acquisition of range information can increase market liquidity and the sensitivity of price under some conditions and decrease them under some other conditions.
title The asymmetrical Acquisition of information about the range of asset value in market
topic Theoretical Economics
url https://arxiv.org/abs/2508.09615