Project Submission Games in Participatory Budgeting
Fuente:
arXiv
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| Hauptverfasser: | , , , , |
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| Format: | Preprint |
| Veröffentlicht: |
2025
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| _version_ | 1866913988461199360 |
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| author | Faliszewski, Piotr Janeczko, Łukasz Kaczmarczyk, Andrzej Lisowski, Grzegorz Pierczyński, Grzegorz |
| author_facet | Faliszewski, Piotr Janeczko, Łukasz Kaczmarczyk, Andrzej Lisowski, Grzegorz Pierczyński, Grzegorz |
| contents | We introduce the framework of project submission games, capturing the behavior of project proposers in participatory budgeting (and multiwinner elections). Here, each proposer submits a subset of project proposals, aiming at maximizing the total cost of those that get funded. We focus on finding conditions under which pure Nash equilibria (NE) exist in our games, and on the complexity of checking whether they exist. We also seek algorithms for computing best responses for the proposers |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2508_09741 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2025 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Project Submission Games in Participatory Budgeting Faliszewski, Piotr Janeczko, Łukasz Kaczmarczyk, Andrzej Lisowski, Grzegorz Pierczyński, Grzegorz Computer Science and Game Theory I.2.11 We introduce the framework of project submission games, capturing the behavior of project proposers in participatory budgeting (and multiwinner elections). Here, each proposer submits a subset of project proposals, aiming at maximizing the total cost of those that get funded. We focus on finding conditions under which pure Nash equilibria (NE) exist in our games, and on the complexity of checking whether they exist. We also seek algorithms for computing best responses for the proposers |
| title | Project Submission Games in Participatory Budgeting |
| topic | Computer Science and Game Theory I.2.11 |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2508.09741 |