Salty Seagull: A VSAT Honeynet to Follow the Bread Crumb of Attacks in Ship Networks
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arXiv
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| Autori principali: | , , , , |
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| Natura: | Preprint |
| Pubblicazione: |
2025
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| _version_ | 1866913111626219520 |
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| author | Makrakis, Georgios Michail Pijpker, Jeroen Hassing, Remco Loves, Rob McCombie, Stephen |
| author_facet | Makrakis, Georgios Michail Pijpker, Jeroen Hassing, Remco Loves, Rob McCombie, Stephen |
| contents | Cyber threats against the maritime industry have increased notably in recent years, highlighting the need for innovative cybersecurity approaches. Ships, as critical assets, possess highly specialized and interconnected network infrastructures, where their legacy systems and operational constraints further exacerbate their vulnerability to cyberattacks. To better understand this evolving threat landscape, we propose the use of cyber-deception techniques and in particular honeynets, as a means to gather valuable insights into ongoing attack campaigns targeting the maritime sector.
In this paper we present Salty Seagull, a honeynet conceived to simulate a VSAT system for ships. This environment mimics the operations of a functional VSAT system onboard and, at the same time, enables a user to interact with it through a Web dashboard and a CLI environment. Furthermore, based on existing vulnerabilities, we purposefully integrate them into our system to increase attacker engagement. We exposed our honeynet for 30 days to the Internet to assess its capability and measured the received interaction. Results show that while numerous generic attacks have been attempted, only one curious attacker with knowledge of the nature of the system and its vulnerabilities managed to access it, without however exploring its full potential. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2508_11325 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2025 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Salty Seagull: A VSAT Honeynet to Follow the Bread Crumb of Attacks in Ship Networks Makrakis, Georgios Michail Pijpker, Jeroen Hassing, Remco Loves, Rob McCombie, Stephen Cryptography and Security Cyber threats against the maritime industry have increased notably in recent years, highlighting the need for innovative cybersecurity approaches. Ships, as critical assets, possess highly specialized and interconnected network infrastructures, where their legacy systems and operational constraints further exacerbate their vulnerability to cyberattacks. To better understand this evolving threat landscape, we propose the use of cyber-deception techniques and in particular honeynets, as a means to gather valuable insights into ongoing attack campaigns targeting the maritime sector. In this paper we present Salty Seagull, a honeynet conceived to simulate a VSAT system for ships. This environment mimics the operations of a functional VSAT system onboard and, at the same time, enables a user to interact with it through a Web dashboard and a CLI environment. Furthermore, based on existing vulnerabilities, we purposefully integrate them into our system to increase attacker engagement. We exposed our honeynet for 30 days to the Internet to assess its capability and measured the received interaction. Results show that while numerous generic attacks have been attempted, only one curious attacker with knowledge of the nature of the system and its vulnerabilities managed to access it, without however exploring its full potential. |
| title | Salty Seagull: A VSAT Honeynet to Follow the Bread Crumb of Attacks in Ship Networks |
| topic | Cryptography and Security |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2508.11325 |