Co-Investment with Payoff-Sharing Mechanism for Cooperative Decision-Making in Network Design Games
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arXiv
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| Hauptverfasser: | , , , , |
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| Format: | Preprint |
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2025
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| _version_ | 1866911435936759808 |
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| author | He, Mingjia Censi, Andrea Zhang, Runyu Frazzoli, Emilio Zardini, Gioele |
| author_facet | He, Mingjia Censi, Andrea Zhang, Runyu Frazzoli, Emilio Zardini, Gioele |
| contents | Network-based systems are inherently interconnected, with the design and performance of subnetworks being interdependent. However, the decisions of self-interested operators may lead to suboptimal outcomes for users and the overall system. This paper explores cooperative mechanisms that can simultaneously benefit both operators and users. We address this challenge using a game-theoretical framework that integrates both non-cooperative and cooperative game theory. In the non-cooperative stage, we propose a network design game in which subnetwork decision-makers strategically design local infrastructures. In the cooperative stage, co-investment with payoff-sharing mechanism is developed to enlarge collective benefits and fairly distribute them. To demonstrate the effectiveness of our framework, we conduct case studies on the Sioux Falls network and real-world public transport networks in Zurich and Winterthur, Switzerland. Our evaluation considers impacts on environmental sustainability, social welfare, and economic efficiency. The proposed framework provides a foundation for improving interdependent networked systems by enabling strategic cooperation among self-interested operators. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2508_12059 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2025 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Co-Investment with Payoff-Sharing Mechanism for Cooperative Decision-Making in Network Design Games He, Mingjia Censi, Andrea Zhang, Runyu Frazzoli, Emilio Zardini, Gioele Systems and Control Computer Science and Game Theory Network-based systems are inherently interconnected, with the design and performance of subnetworks being interdependent. However, the decisions of self-interested operators may lead to suboptimal outcomes for users and the overall system. This paper explores cooperative mechanisms that can simultaneously benefit both operators and users. We address this challenge using a game-theoretical framework that integrates both non-cooperative and cooperative game theory. In the non-cooperative stage, we propose a network design game in which subnetwork decision-makers strategically design local infrastructures. In the cooperative stage, co-investment with payoff-sharing mechanism is developed to enlarge collective benefits and fairly distribute them. To demonstrate the effectiveness of our framework, we conduct case studies on the Sioux Falls network and real-world public transport networks in Zurich and Winterthur, Switzerland. Our evaluation considers impacts on environmental sustainability, social welfare, and economic efficiency. The proposed framework provides a foundation for improving interdependent networked systems by enabling strategic cooperation among self-interested operators. |
| title | Co-Investment with Payoff-Sharing Mechanism for Cooperative Decision-Making in Network Design Games |
| topic | Systems and Control Computer Science and Game Theory |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2508.12059 |