Dynamic Non-Bayesian Persuasion
Fuente:
arXiv
Gespeichert in:
| 1. Verfasser: | |
|---|---|
| Format: | Preprint |
| Veröffentlicht: |
2025
|
| Schlagworte: | |
| Online-Zugang: | |
| Tags: |
Tag hinzufügen
Keine Tags, Fügen Sie den ersten Tag hinzu!
|
| _version_ | 1866914480944840704 |
|---|---|
| author | Kobayashi, Masanori |
| author_facet | Kobayashi, Masanori |
| contents | If a sender in a persuasion game can use a sequence of experiments rather than a single experiment, does this change the sender's value? We show that the sender can benefit more from dynamic persuasion than from static persuasion when the receiver is not Bayesian. Our main result shows that, under mild regularity conditions, divisibility, introduced in Cripps (2018), characterizes the receiver's updating rules under which the sender is indifferent between static and dynamic persuasion in any environment. Consequently, restricting attention to static persuasion is without loss precisely under divisible updating rules. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2508_12328 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2025 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Dynamic Non-Bayesian Persuasion Kobayashi, Masanori Theoretical Economics If a sender in a persuasion game can use a sequence of experiments rather than a single experiment, does this change the sender's value? We show that the sender can benefit more from dynamic persuasion than from static persuasion when the receiver is not Bayesian. Our main result shows that, under mild regularity conditions, divisibility, introduced in Cripps (2018), characterizes the receiver's updating rules under which the sender is indifferent between static and dynamic persuasion in any environment. Consequently, restricting attention to static persuasion is without loss precisely under divisible updating rules. |
| title | Dynamic Non-Bayesian Persuasion |
| topic | Theoretical Economics |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2508.12328 |