MCPXKIT: The Unified Toolkit for Analyzing Model Context Protocol Security
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arXiv
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| Autori principali: | , , , , , , , |
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| Natura: | Preprint |
| Pubblicazione: |
2025
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| _version_ | 1866918520460148736 |
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| author | Guo, Yongjian Liu, Puzhuo Ma, Wanlun Deng, Zehang Zhu, Xiaogang Di, Peng Xiao, Xi Wen, Sheng |
| author_facet | Guo, Yongjian Liu, Puzhuo Ma, Wanlun Deng, Zehang Zhu, Xiaogang Di, Peng Xiao, Xi Wen, Sheng |
| contents | The Model Context Protocol (MCP) has emerged as a universal standard that enables AI agents to seamlessly connect with external tools, significantly enhancing their functionality. However, while MCP brings notable benefits, it also introduces significant vulnerabilities, such as Tool Poisoning Attacks (TPA), where hidden malicious instructions exploit the sycophancy of large language models (LLMs) to manipulate agent behavior. Despite these risks, current academic research on MCP security remains limited, with most studies focusing on narrow or qualitative analyses that fail to capture the diversity of real-world threats. To address this gap, we present the MCP eXploit Toolkit (MCPXKIT), which categorizes and implements 31 distinct attack methods under four key classifications: direct tool injection, indirect tool injection, malicious user attacks, and LLM inherent attack. We further conduct a quantitative analysis of the efficacy of each attack. Our experiments reveal key insights into MCP vulnerabilities, including agents' blind reliance on tool descriptions, sensitivity to file-based attacks, chain attacks exploiting shared context, and difficulty distinguishing external data from executable commands. These insights, validated through attack experiments, underscore the urgency for robust defense strategies and informed MCP design. Our contributions include 1) constructing a comprehensive MCP attack taxonomy, 2) introducing a unified attack framework, MCPXKIT, and 3) conducting empirical vulnerability analysis to enhance MCP security mechanisms. This work provides a foundational framework, supporting the secure evolution of MCP ecosystems. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2508_12538 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2025 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | MCPXKIT: The Unified Toolkit for Analyzing Model Context Protocol Security Guo, Yongjian Liu, Puzhuo Ma, Wanlun Deng, Zehang Zhu, Xiaogang Di, Peng Xiao, Xi Wen, Sheng Cryptography and Security Artificial Intelligence Software Engineering The Model Context Protocol (MCP) has emerged as a universal standard that enables AI agents to seamlessly connect with external tools, significantly enhancing their functionality. However, while MCP brings notable benefits, it also introduces significant vulnerabilities, such as Tool Poisoning Attacks (TPA), where hidden malicious instructions exploit the sycophancy of large language models (LLMs) to manipulate agent behavior. Despite these risks, current academic research on MCP security remains limited, with most studies focusing on narrow or qualitative analyses that fail to capture the diversity of real-world threats. To address this gap, we present the MCP eXploit Toolkit (MCPXKIT), which categorizes and implements 31 distinct attack methods under four key classifications: direct tool injection, indirect tool injection, malicious user attacks, and LLM inherent attack. We further conduct a quantitative analysis of the efficacy of each attack. Our experiments reveal key insights into MCP vulnerabilities, including agents' blind reliance on tool descriptions, sensitivity to file-based attacks, chain attacks exploiting shared context, and difficulty distinguishing external data from executable commands. These insights, validated through attack experiments, underscore the urgency for robust defense strategies and informed MCP design. Our contributions include 1) constructing a comprehensive MCP attack taxonomy, 2) introducing a unified attack framework, MCPXKIT, and 3) conducting empirical vulnerability analysis to enhance MCP security mechanisms. This work provides a foundational framework, supporting the secure evolution of MCP ecosystems. |
| title | MCPXKIT: The Unified Toolkit for Analyzing Model Context Protocol Security |
| topic | Cryptography and Security Artificial Intelligence Software Engineering |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2508.12538 |