Group Fair Matchings using Convex Cost Functions
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arXiv
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| Format: | Preprint |
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2025
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| _version_ | 1866911109615714304 |
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| author | Panda, Atasi Sharma, Harsh Louis, Anand Nimbhorkar, Prajakta |
| author_facet | Panda, Atasi Sharma, Harsh Louis, Anand Nimbhorkar, Prajakta |
| contents | We consider the problem of assigning items to platforms where each item has a utility associated with each of the platforms to which it can be assigned. Each platform has a soft constraint over the total number of items it serves, modeled via a convex cost function. Additionally, items are partitioned into groups, and each platform also incurs group-specific convex cost over the number of items from each group that can be assigned to the platform. These costs promote group fairness by penalizing imbalances, yielding a soft variation of fairness notions introduced in prior work, such as Restricted Dominance and Minority protection. Restricted Dominance enforces upper bounds on group representation, while Minority protection enforces lower bounds. Our approach replaces such hard constraints with cost-based penalties, allowing more flexible trade-offs. Our model also captures Nash Social Welfare kind of objective.
The cost of an assignment is the sum of the values of all the cost functions across all the groups and platforms. The objective is to find an assignment that minimizes the cost while achieving a total utility that is at least a user-specified threshold. The main challenge lies in balancing the overall platform cost with group-specific costs, both governed by convex functions, while meeting the utility constraint. We present an efficient polynomial-time approximation algorithm, supported by theoretical guarantees and experimental evaluation. Our algorithm is based on techniques involving linear programming and network flows. We also provide an exact algorithm for a special case with uniform utilities and establish the hardness of the general problem when the groups can intersect arbitrarily. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2508_12549 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2025 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Group Fair Matchings using Convex Cost Functions Panda, Atasi Sharma, Harsh Louis, Anand Nimbhorkar, Prajakta Computer Science and Game Theory Data Structures and Algorithms Multiagent Systems We consider the problem of assigning items to platforms where each item has a utility associated with each of the platforms to which it can be assigned. Each platform has a soft constraint over the total number of items it serves, modeled via a convex cost function. Additionally, items are partitioned into groups, and each platform also incurs group-specific convex cost over the number of items from each group that can be assigned to the platform. These costs promote group fairness by penalizing imbalances, yielding a soft variation of fairness notions introduced in prior work, such as Restricted Dominance and Minority protection. Restricted Dominance enforces upper bounds on group representation, while Minority protection enforces lower bounds. Our approach replaces such hard constraints with cost-based penalties, allowing more flexible trade-offs. Our model also captures Nash Social Welfare kind of objective. The cost of an assignment is the sum of the values of all the cost functions across all the groups and platforms. The objective is to find an assignment that minimizes the cost while achieving a total utility that is at least a user-specified threshold. The main challenge lies in balancing the overall platform cost with group-specific costs, both governed by convex functions, while meeting the utility constraint. We present an efficient polynomial-time approximation algorithm, supported by theoretical guarantees and experimental evaluation. Our algorithm is based on techniques involving linear programming and network flows. We also provide an exact algorithm for a special case with uniform utilities and establish the hardness of the general problem when the groups can intersect arbitrarily. |
| title | Group Fair Matchings using Convex Cost Functions |
| topic | Computer Science and Game Theory Data Structures and Algorithms Multiagent Systems |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2508.12549 |