Generics and Default Reasoning in Large Language Models

Fuente: arXiv
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Autori principali: Kirkpatrick, James Ravi, Sterken, Rachel Katharine
Natura: Preprint
Pubblicazione: 2025
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author Kirkpatrick, James Ravi
Sterken, Rachel Katharine
author_facet Kirkpatrick, James Ravi
Sterken, Rachel Katharine
contents This paper evaluates the capabilities of 28 large language models (LLMs) to reason with 20 defeasible reasoning patterns involving generic generalizations (e.g., 'Birds fly', 'Ravens are black') central to non-monotonic logic. Generics are of special interest to linguists, philosophers, logicians, and cognitive scientists because of their complex exception-permitting behaviour and their centrality to default reasoning, cognition, and concept acquisition. We find that while several frontier models handle many default reasoning problems well, performance varies widely across models and prompting styles. Few-shot prompting modestly improves performance for some models, but chain-of-thought (CoT) prompting often leads to serious performance degradation (mean accuracy drop -11.14%, SD 15.74% in models performing above 75% accuracy in zero-shot condition, temperature 0). Most models either struggle to distinguish between defeasible and deductive inference or misinterpret generics as universal statements. These findings underscore both the promise and limits of current LLMs for default reasoning.
format Preprint
id arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2508_13718
institution arXiv
publishDate 2025
record_format arxiv
spellingShingle Generics and Default Reasoning in Large Language Models
Kirkpatrick, James Ravi
Sterken, Rachel Katharine
Computation and Language
Artificial Intelligence
Logic in Computer Science
This paper evaluates the capabilities of 28 large language models (LLMs) to reason with 20 defeasible reasoning patterns involving generic generalizations (e.g., 'Birds fly', 'Ravens are black') central to non-monotonic logic. Generics are of special interest to linguists, philosophers, logicians, and cognitive scientists because of their complex exception-permitting behaviour and their centrality to default reasoning, cognition, and concept acquisition. We find that while several frontier models handle many default reasoning problems well, performance varies widely across models and prompting styles. Few-shot prompting modestly improves performance for some models, but chain-of-thought (CoT) prompting often leads to serious performance degradation (mean accuracy drop -11.14%, SD 15.74% in models performing above 75% accuracy in zero-shot condition, temperature 0). Most models either struggle to distinguish between defeasible and deductive inference or misinterpret generics as universal statements. These findings underscore both the promise and limits of current LLMs for default reasoning.
title Generics and Default Reasoning in Large Language Models
topic Computation and Language
Artificial Intelligence
Logic in Computer Science
url https://arxiv.org/abs/2508.13718