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Explainable Information Design

Fuente: arXiv

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Bibliographic Details
Main Authors:	Chen, Yiling, Lin, Tao, Tang, Wei, Tucker-Foltz, Jamie
Format:	Preprint
Published:	2025
Subjects:	Computer Science and Game Theory Data Structures and Algorithms Theoretical Economics
Online Access:	Acceder al recurso
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