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| Format: | Preprint |
| Veröffentlicht: |
2025
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| Online-Zugang: | https://arxiv.org/abs/2508.14301 |
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| _version_ | 1866916026493435904 |
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| author | Cumming, Douglas |
| author_facet | Cumming, Douglas |
| contents | I study commercial revenue at 26 finance journals over 1999-2025, exploiting the creation of the Elsevier Finance Journal Ecosystem (a formal network of coordinated journals planned in 2019 and launched in 2020) as a quasi-natural experiment. Using synthetic control as the primary identification strategy, I find that ecosystem membership generated a projected long-run commercial revenue effect of approximately \$54-\$59 million in real 2024 USD, comprising \$48 million in citation-mechanism-implied APC revenue and \$6-\$11 million in incremental submission-fee revenue (the submission-fee range reflects uncertainty about the share of extra submissions arriving via Elsevier's Article Transfer Service, which generates no incremental fee at the receiving journal). Of this total, approximately \$40-\$44 million is directly observed and realized through 2025 (a \$36 million synthetic-control gap on APC flow revenue plus \$4-\$8 million in incremental submission fees); the remaining \$14-\$15 million reflects standard submission-to-citation-to-revenue propagation lags from citation gains realized in 2019-2025 that are projected to materialize as publication revenue through approximately 2028. The effect is highly concentrated: four core journals (FRL, IRFA, IREF, RIBAF) account for 95% of the gain. Decomposing the revenue effect into intensive (price) and extensive (volume) margins, 89% comes from expanded publication volume; per-paper pricing power rose modestly if at all. The findings speak to the economics of coordinated networks in information-goods markets and to the industrial organization of scholarly publishing. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2508_14301 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2025 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | The Revenue of Finance Journals: Networks, Pricing Power, and Publication Volume Cumming, Douglas General Economics Economics 91G50 I study commercial revenue at 26 finance journals over 1999-2025, exploiting the creation of the Elsevier Finance Journal Ecosystem (a formal network of coordinated journals planned in 2019 and launched in 2020) as a quasi-natural experiment. Using synthetic control as the primary identification strategy, I find that ecosystem membership generated a projected long-run commercial revenue effect of approximately \$54-\$59 million in real 2024 USD, comprising \$48 million in citation-mechanism-implied APC revenue and \$6-\$11 million in incremental submission-fee revenue (the submission-fee range reflects uncertainty about the share of extra submissions arriving via Elsevier's Article Transfer Service, which generates no incremental fee at the receiving journal). Of this total, approximately \$40-\$44 million is directly observed and realized through 2025 (a \$36 million synthetic-control gap on APC flow revenue plus \$4-\$8 million in incremental submission fees); the remaining \$14-\$15 million reflects standard submission-to-citation-to-revenue propagation lags from citation gains realized in 2019-2025 that are projected to materialize as publication revenue through approximately 2028. The effect is highly concentrated: four core journals (FRL, IRFA, IREF, RIBAF) account for 95% of the gain. Decomposing the revenue effect into intensive (price) and extensive (volume) margins, 89% comes from expanded publication volume; per-paper pricing power rose modestly if at all. The findings speak to the economics of coordinated networks in information-goods markets and to the industrial organization of scholarly publishing. |
| title | The Revenue of Finance Journals: Networks, Pricing Power, and Publication Volume |
| topic | General Economics Economics 91G50 |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2508.14301 |