Properties of Egalitarian Sequences of Committees: Theory and Experiments

Fuente: arXiv
Saved in:
Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: Böhm, Paula, Bredereck, Robert, Fluschnik, Till
Format: Preprint
Published: 2025
Subjects:
Online Access:
Tags: Add Tag
No Tags, Be the first to tag this record!
_version_ 1866909745340743680
author Böhm, Paula
Bredereck, Robert
Fluschnik, Till
author_facet Böhm, Paula
Bredereck, Robert
Fluschnik, Till
contents We study the task of electing egalitarian sequences of $τ$ committees given a set of agents with additive utilities for candidates available on each of $τ$ levels. We introduce several rules for electing an egalitarian committee sequence as well as properties for such rules. We settle the computational complexity of finding a winning sequence for our rules and classify them against our properties. Additionally, we transform sequential election data from existing election data from the literature. Using this data set, we compare our rules empirically and test them experimentally against our properties.
format Preprint
id arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2508_14439
institution arXiv
publishDate 2025
record_format arxiv
spellingShingle Properties of Egalitarian Sequences of Committees: Theory and Experiments
Böhm, Paula
Bredereck, Robert
Fluschnik, Till
Computer Science and Game Theory
Data Structures and Algorithms
91B12 (Primary) 91B14 (Secondary)
F.2.2; G.2.1; G.2.3; J.4
We study the task of electing egalitarian sequences of $τ$ committees given a set of agents with additive utilities for candidates available on each of $τ$ levels. We introduce several rules for electing an egalitarian committee sequence as well as properties for such rules. We settle the computational complexity of finding a winning sequence for our rules and classify them against our properties. Additionally, we transform sequential election data from existing election data from the literature. Using this data set, we compare our rules empirically and test them experimentally against our properties.
title Properties of Egalitarian Sequences of Committees: Theory and Experiments
topic Computer Science and Game Theory
Data Structures and Algorithms
91B12 (Primary) 91B14 (Secondary)
F.2.2; G.2.1; G.2.3; J.4
url https://arxiv.org/abs/2508.14439