The practical issues of side-channel-secure quantum key distribution
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arXiv
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| Main Authors: | , , , , |
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| Format: | Preprint |
| Published: |
2025
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| _version_ | 1866912546415443968 |
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| author | Jiang, Cong Hu, Xiao-Long Yu, Zong-Wen Xu, Hai Wang, Xiang-Bin |
| author_facet | Jiang, Cong Hu, Xiao-Long Yu, Zong-Wen Xu, Hai Wang, Xiang-Bin |
| contents | Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) leverages the principles of quantum mechanics to provide theoretically unconditional security for cryptographic key sharing. However, practical implementations remain vulnerable due to non-ideal devices and potential security loopholes at both the source and detection sides of QKD systems. The side-channel-secure (SCS) protocol addresses these challenges by encoding bits in vacuum and non-vacuum states and introducing a third-party measurement node, thereby repelling attacks targeting the detection side as well as external lab attacks on the source side. In this work, we consider the state-dependent correlated errors and Trojan-horse attack while preserving the SCS protocol's key advantage-specifically, requiring only upper bounds on intensities characterization without needing a full description of quantum states in infinite dimensions. Numerical results demonstrate that when the reflected light intensity from Trojan-horse attacks falls below $10^{-6}$, Eve can scarcely extract additional key information from the reflections. This work makes the SCS protocol more practical. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2508_15197 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2025 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | The practical issues of side-channel-secure quantum key distribution Jiang, Cong Hu, Xiao-Long Yu, Zong-Wen Xu, Hai Wang, Xiang-Bin Quantum Physics Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) leverages the principles of quantum mechanics to provide theoretically unconditional security for cryptographic key sharing. However, practical implementations remain vulnerable due to non-ideal devices and potential security loopholes at both the source and detection sides of QKD systems. The side-channel-secure (SCS) protocol addresses these challenges by encoding bits in vacuum and non-vacuum states and introducing a third-party measurement node, thereby repelling attacks targeting the detection side as well as external lab attacks on the source side. In this work, we consider the state-dependent correlated errors and Trojan-horse attack while preserving the SCS protocol's key advantage-specifically, requiring only upper bounds on intensities characterization without needing a full description of quantum states in infinite dimensions. Numerical results demonstrate that when the reflected light intensity from Trojan-horse attacks falls below $10^{-6}$, Eve can scarcely extract additional key information from the reflections. This work makes the SCS protocol more practical. |
| title | The practical issues of side-channel-secure quantum key distribution |
| topic | Quantum Physics |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2508.15197 |