How to Beat Nakamoto in the Race
Fuente:
arXiv
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| Autori principali: | , |
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| Natura: | Preprint |
| Pubblicazione: |
2025
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| Accesso online: | |
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| _version_ | 1866918141020340224 |
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| author | Cao, Shu-Jie Guo, Dongning |
| author_facet | Cao, Shu-Jie Guo, Dongning |
| contents | This paper studies proof-of-work Nakamoto consensus protocols under bounded network delays, settling two long-standing questions in blockchain security: What is the most effective attack on block safety under a given block confirmation latency? And what is the resulting probability of safety violation? A Markov decision process (MDP) framework is introduced to precisely characterize the system state (including the blocktree and timings of all blocks mined), the adversary's potential actions, and the state transitions due to the adversarial action and the random block arrival processes. An optimal attack, called bait-and-switch, is proposed and proved to maximize the adversary's chance of violating block safety by "beating Nakamoto in the race". The exact probability of this violation is calculated for any given confirmation depth using Markov chain analysis, offering fresh insights into the interplay of network delay, confirmation rules, and blockchain security. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2508_16202 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2025 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | How to Beat Nakamoto in the Race Cao, Shu-Jie Guo, Dongning Cryptography and Security This paper studies proof-of-work Nakamoto consensus protocols under bounded network delays, settling two long-standing questions in blockchain security: What is the most effective attack on block safety under a given block confirmation latency? And what is the resulting probability of safety violation? A Markov decision process (MDP) framework is introduced to precisely characterize the system state (including the blocktree and timings of all blocks mined), the adversary's potential actions, and the state transitions due to the adversarial action and the random block arrival processes. An optimal attack, called bait-and-switch, is proposed and proved to maximize the adversary's chance of violating block safety by "beating Nakamoto in the race". The exact probability of this violation is calculated for any given confirmation depth using Markov chain analysis, offering fresh insights into the interplay of network delay, confirmation rules, and blockchain security. |
| title | How to Beat Nakamoto in the Race |
| topic | Cryptography and Security |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2508.16202 |