PromptFlare: Prompt-Generalized Defense via Cross-Attention Decoy in Diffusion-Based Inpainting

Fuente: arXiv
Salvato in:
Dettagli Bibliografici
Autori principali: Na, Hohyun, Hong, Seunghoo, Woo, Simon S.
Natura: Preprint
Pubblicazione: 2025
Soggetti:
Accesso online:
Tags: Aggiungi Tag
Nessun Tag, puoi essere il primo ad aggiungerne!!
_version_ 1866911116598181888
author Na, Hohyun
Hong, Seunghoo
Woo, Simon S.
author_facet Na, Hohyun
Hong, Seunghoo
Woo, Simon S.
contents The success of diffusion models has enabled effortless, high-quality image modifications that precisely align with users' intentions, thereby raising concerns about their potential misuse by malicious actors. Previous studies have attempted to mitigate such misuse through adversarial attacks. However, these approaches heavily rely on image-level inconsistencies, which pose fundamental limitations in addressing the influence of textual prompts. In this paper, we propose PromptFlare, a novel adversarial protection method designed to protect images from malicious modifications facilitated by diffusion-based inpainting models. Our approach leverages the cross-attention mechanism to exploit the intrinsic properties of prompt embeddings. Specifically, we identify and target shared token of prompts that is invariant and semantically uninformative, injecting adversarial noise to suppress the sampling process. The injected noise acts as a cross-attention decoy, diverting the model's focus away from meaningful prompt-image alignments and thereby neutralizing the effect of prompt. Extensive experiments on the EditBench dataset demonstrate that our method achieves state-of-the-art performance across various metrics while significantly reducing computational overhead and GPU memory usage. These findings highlight PromptFlare as a robust and efficient protection against unauthorized image manipulations. The code is available at https://github.com/NAHOHYUN-SKKU/PromptFlare.
format Preprint
id arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2508_16217
institution arXiv
publishDate 2025
record_format arxiv
spellingShingle PromptFlare: Prompt-Generalized Defense via Cross-Attention Decoy in Diffusion-Based Inpainting
Na, Hohyun
Hong, Seunghoo
Woo, Simon S.
Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition
The success of diffusion models has enabled effortless, high-quality image modifications that precisely align with users' intentions, thereby raising concerns about their potential misuse by malicious actors. Previous studies have attempted to mitigate such misuse through adversarial attacks. However, these approaches heavily rely on image-level inconsistencies, which pose fundamental limitations in addressing the influence of textual prompts. In this paper, we propose PromptFlare, a novel adversarial protection method designed to protect images from malicious modifications facilitated by diffusion-based inpainting models. Our approach leverages the cross-attention mechanism to exploit the intrinsic properties of prompt embeddings. Specifically, we identify and target shared token of prompts that is invariant and semantically uninformative, injecting adversarial noise to suppress the sampling process. The injected noise acts as a cross-attention decoy, diverting the model's focus away from meaningful prompt-image alignments and thereby neutralizing the effect of prompt. Extensive experiments on the EditBench dataset demonstrate that our method achieves state-of-the-art performance across various metrics while significantly reducing computational overhead and GPU memory usage. These findings highlight PromptFlare as a robust and efficient protection against unauthorized image manipulations. The code is available at https://github.com/NAHOHYUN-SKKU/PromptFlare.
title PromptFlare: Prompt-Generalized Defense via Cross-Attention Decoy in Diffusion-Based Inpainting
topic Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition
url https://arxiv.org/abs/2508.16217