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Hauptverfasser: Wu, Hongjia, Xu, Minrui, Xiong, Zehui, Gao, Lin, Pan, Haoyuan, Niyato, Dusit, Chan, Tse-Tin
Format: Preprint
Veröffentlicht: 2025
Schlagworte:
Online-Zugang:https://arxiv.org/abs/2508.16251
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author Wu, Hongjia
Xu, Minrui
Xiong, Zehui
Gao, Lin
Pan, Haoyuan
Niyato, Dusit
Chan, Tse-Tin
author_facet Wu, Hongjia
Xu, Minrui
Xiong, Zehui
Gao, Lin
Pan, Haoyuan
Niyato, Dusit
Chan, Tse-Tin
contents With rapid advancements in large language models (LLMs), AI-generated content (AIGC) has emerged as a key driver of technological innovation and economic transformation. Personalizing AIGC services to meet individual user demands is essential but challenging for AIGC service providers (ASPs) due to the subjective and complex demands of mobile users (MUs), as well as the computational and communication resource constraints faced by ASPs. To tackle these challenges, we first develop a novel multi-dimensional quality-of-experience (QoE) metric. This metric comprehensively evaluates AIGC services by integrating accuracy, token count, and timeliness. We focus on a mobile edge computing (MEC)-enabled AIGC network, consisting of multiple ASPs deploying differentiated AIGC models on edge servers and multiple MUs with heterogeneous QoE requirements requesting AIGC services from ASPs. To incentivize ASPs to provide personalized AIGC services under MEC resource constraints, we propose a QoE-driven incentive mechanism. We formulate the problem as an equilibrium problem with equilibrium constraints (EPEC), where MUs as leaders determine rewards, while ASPs as followers optimize resource allocation. To solve this, we develop a dual-perturbation reward optimization algorithm, reducing the implementation complexity of adaptive pricing. Experimental results demonstrate that our proposed mechanism achieves a reduction of approximately $64.9\%$ in average computational and communication overhead, while the average service cost for MUs and the resource consumption of ASPs decrease by $66.5\%$ and $76.8\%$, respectively, compared to state-of-the-art benchmarks.
format Preprint
id arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2508_16251
institution arXiv
publishDate 2025
record_format arxiv
spellingShingle A QoE-Driven Personalized Incentive Mechanism Design for AIGC Services in Resource-Constrained Edge Networks
Wu, Hongjia
Xu, Minrui
Xiong, Zehui
Gao, Lin
Pan, Haoyuan
Niyato, Dusit
Chan, Tse-Tin
Computer Science and Game Theory
With rapid advancements in large language models (LLMs), AI-generated content (AIGC) has emerged as a key driver of technological innovation and economic transformation. Personalizing AIGC services to meet individual user demands is essential but challenging for AIGC service providers (ASPs) due to the subjective and complex demands of mobile users (MUs), as well as the computational and communication resource constraints faced by ASPs. To tackle these challenges, we first develop a novel multi-dimensional quality-of-experience (QoE) metric. This metric comprehensively evaluates AIGC services by integrating accuracy, token count, and timeliness. We focus on a mobile edge computing (MEC)-enabled AIGC network, consisting of multiple ASPs deploying differentiated AIGC models on edge servers and multiple MUs with heterogeneous QoE requirements requesting AIGC services from ASPs. To incentivize ASPs to provide personalized AIGC services under MEC resource constraints, we propose a QoE-driven incentive mechanism. We formulate the problem as an equilibrium problem with equilibrium constraints (EPEC), where MUs as leaders determine rewards, while ASPs as followers optimize resource allocation. To solve this, we develop a dual-perturbation reward optimization algorithm, reducing the implementation complexity of adaptive pricing. Experimental results demonstrate that our proposed mechanism achieves a reduction of approximately $64.9\%$ in average computational and communication overhead, while the average service cost for MUs and the resource consumption of ASPs decrease by $66.5\%$ and $76.8\%$, respectively, compared to state-of-the-art benchmarks.
title A QoE-Driven Personalized Incentive Mechanism Design for AIGC Services in Resource-Constrained Edge Networks
topic Computer Science and Game Theory
url https://arxiv.org/abs/2508.16251