Fairness of Energy Distribution Mechanisms in Collective Self-Consumption Schemes
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arXiv
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| Autori principali: | , , , , , , , , , , |
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| Natura: | Preprint |
| Pubblicazione: |
2025
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| _version_ | 1866914001691082752 |
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| author | Couraud, Benoit Robu, Valentin Norbu, Sonam Andoni, Merlinda Rozier, Yann Chen, Si Franquet, Erwin Barre, Pierre-Jean Kanugrahan, Satria Putra Berthou, Benjamin Flynn, David |
| author_facet | Couraud, Benoit Robu, Valentin Norbu, Sonam Andoni, Merlinda Rozier, Yann Chen, Si Franquet, Erwin Barre, Pierre-Jean Kanugrahan, Satria Putra Berthou, Benjamin Flynn, David |
| contents | In several European countries, regulatory frameworks now allow households to form energy communities and trade energy locally via local energy markets (LEMs). While multiple mechanisms exist to allocate locally produced energy among members, their fairness remains insufficiently understood despite energy justice being a key concern for communities. This paper first provides a thorough description of the collective self-consumption process in France, offering a real world framework for researchers. We then review the main types of fairness relevant to LEMs and identify appropriate indicators for each, including a new scalable indicator to evaluate meritocratic fairness. Using simulations across 250 randomly generated residential communities of 20 households, we assess and compare fairness across different LEM distribution mechanisms. Results show that average financial savings reach 12% with 40% PV uptake. Among the four widely used LEM mechanisms assessed, glass-filling with prioritization yields the highest egalitarian and min max fairness. Double auction and pro rata schemes promote meritocracy, while standard glass filling offers a strong balance across fairness objectives. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2508_16819 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2025 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Fairness of Energy Distribution Mechanisms in Collective Self-Consumption Schemes Couraud, Benoit Robu, Valentin Norbu, Sonam Andoni, Merlinda Rozier, Yann Chen, Si Franquet, Erwin Barre, Pierre-Jean Kanugrahan, Satria Putra Berthou, Benjamin Flynn, David Computers and Society Systems and Control In several European countries, regulatory frameworks now allow households to form energy communities and trade energy locally via local energy markets (LEMs). While multiple mechanisms exist to allocate locally produced energy among members, their fairness remains insufficiently understood despite energy justice being a key concern for communities. This paper first provides a thorough description of the collective self-consumption process in France, offering a real world framework for researchers. We then review the main types of fairness relevant to LEMs and identify appropriate indicators for each, including a new scalable indicator to evaluate meritocratic fairness. Using simulations across 250 randomly generated residential communities of 20 households, we assess and compare fairness across different LEM distribution mechanisms. Results show that average financial savings reach 12% with 40% PV uptake. Among the four widely used LEM mechanisms assessed, glass-filling with prioritization yields the highest egalitarian and min max fairness. Double auction and pro rata schemes promote meritocracy, while standard glass filling offers a strong balance across fairness objectives. |
| title | Fairness of Energy Distribution Mechanisms in Collective Self-Consumption Schemes |
| topic | Computers and Society Systems and Control |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2508.16819 |