Ambiguous Persuasion with Prior Ambiguity
Fuente:
arXiv
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| Format: | Preprint |
| Published: |
2025
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| _version_ | 1866911121509711872 |
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| author | Cheng, Xiaoyu |
| author_facet | Cheng, Xiaoyu |
| contents | Cheng (2025) establishes that in a persuasion game where both the sender and the receiver have Maxmin Expected Utility (MEU) preferences, the sender never strictly benefits from using ambiguous communication strategies over standard (non-ambiguous) ones. This note extends the analysis to environments with prior ambiguity, i.e., pre-existing ambiguity about the payoff-relevant state, and shows that, in the binary state and binary action case, the same no-gain result continues to hold. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2508_18603 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2025 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Ambiguous Persuasion with Prior Ambiguity Cheng, Xiaoyu Theoretical Economics Cheng (2025) establishes that in a persuasion game where both the sender and the receiver have Maxmin Expected Utility (MEU) preferences, the sender never strictly benefits from using ambiguous communication strategies over standard (non-ambiguous) ones. This note extends the analysis to environments with prior ambiguity, i.e., pre-existing ambiguity about the payoff-relevant state, and shows that, in the binary state and binary action case, the same no-gain result continues to hold. |
| title | Ambiguous Persuasion with Prior Ambiguity |
| topic | Theoretical Economics |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2508.18603 |