Preference for Verifiability
Fuente:
arXiv
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| Autor principal: | |
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| Formato: | Preprint |
| Publicado: |
2025
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| Materias: | |
| Acceso en línea: | |
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| _version_ | 1866918364969959424 |
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| author | Rommeswinkel, Hendrik |
| author_facet | Rommeswinkel, Hendrik |
| contents | Decision makers sometimes cannot observe the consequences of their actions ex-post. This paper axiomatically characterizes a decision model in which the decision maker cares about verifying that a good consequence has been achieved. Preferences over acts identify a set of events the decision maker expects to verify. Decision makers choose acts maximizing, in expectation over verifiable events, the worst-case utility consistent with each event. A dual model captures decision makers who instead seek to obscure poor outcomes from verification. As an application, firms choosing carbon-reduction technologies may prefer less efficient but more verifiable technologies to prove emission reductions to stakeholders. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2508_19585 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2025 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Preference for Verifiability Rommeswinkel, Hendrik Theoretical Economics Decision makers sometimes cannot observe the consequences of their actions ex-post. This paper axiomatically characterizes a decision model in which the decision maker cares about verifying that a good consequence has been achieved. Preferences over acts identify a set of events the decision maker expects to verify. Decision makers choose acts maximizing, in expectation over verifiable events, the worst-case utility consistent with each event. A dual model captures decision makers who instead seek to obscure poor outcomes from verification. As an application, firms choosing carbon-reduction technologies may prefer less efficient but more verifiable technologies to prove emission reductions to stakeholders. |
| title | Preference for Verifiability |
| topic | Theoretical Economics |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2508.19585 |