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| Main Author: | |
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| Format: | Preprint |
| Published: |
2025
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| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | https://arxiv.org/abs/2508.20186 |
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| _version_ | 1866918131825377280 |
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| author | Olejnik, Lukasz |
| author_facet | Olejnik, Lukasz |
| contents | AI-powered influence operations can now be executed end-to-end on commodity hardware. We show that small language models produce coherent, persona-driven political messaging and can be evaluated automatically without human raters. Two behavioural findings emerge. First, persona-over-model: persona design explains behaviour more than model identity. Second, engagement as a stressor: when replies must counter-arguments, ideological adherence strengthens and the prevalence of extreme content increases. We demonstrate that fully automated influence-content production is within reach of both large and small actors. Consequently, defence should shift from restricting model access towards conversation-centric detection and disruption of campaigns and coordination infrastructure. Paradoxically, the very consistency that enables these operations also provides a detection signature. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2508_20186 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2025 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | AI Propaganda factories with language models Olejnik, Lukasz Cryptography and Security Artificial Intelligence Computers and Society AI-powered influence operations can now be executed end-to-end on commodity hardware. We show that small language models produce coherent, persona-driven political messaging and can be evaluated automatically without human raters. Two behavioural findings emerge. First, persona-over-model: persona design explains behaviour more than model identity. Second, engagement as a stressor: when replies must counter-arguments, ideological adherence strengthens and the prevalence of extreme content increases. We demonstrate that fully automated influence-content production is within reach of both large and small actors. Consequently, defence should shift from restricting model access towards conversation-centric detection and disruption of campaigns and coordination infrastructure. Paradoxically, the very consistency that enables these operations also provides a detection signature. |
| title | AI Propaganda factories with language models |
| topic | Cryptography and Security Artificial Intelligence Computers and Society |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2508.20186 |