Saved in:
| Main Author: | |
|---|---|
| Format: | Preprint |
| Published: |
2025
|
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | https://arxiv.org/abs/2509.01126 |
| Tags: |
Add Tag
No Tags, Be the first to tag this record!
|
| _version_ | 1866914015376048128 |
|---|---|
| author | Kroumi, Dhaker |
| author_facet | Kroumi, Dhaker |
| contents | Cooperation often depends on individuals avoiding exploitation and interacting preferentially with other cooperators. We explore how context-dependent migration influences the evolution of cooperation in spatially structured populations. Individuals interact in small groups through public goods games and reproduce with possible dispersal. Cooperators migrate more frequently when surrounded by defectors, while defectors disperse uniformly. This behavioral asymmetry reflects realistic differences in mobility and social responsiveness. Our results show that conditional migration can promote cooperation by enabling cooperators to escape defector-rich environments and cluster together. The effectiveness of this mechanism depends on baseline migration rates, group size, and the sensitivity of cooperators to local conditions. We identify parameter ranges where cooperation is favored even under conditions that would typically hinder its evolution. These findings highlight how behavioral plasticity and dispersal strategies can interact with population structure to support the emergence of cooperation. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2509_01126 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2025 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Sensitivity-Driven Migration and the Evolution of Cooperation in Multi-Player Games on Structured Populations Kroumi, Dhaker Populations and Evolution 91A25, 60J70 Cooperation often depends on individuals avoiding exploitation and interacting preferentially with other cooperators. We explore how context-dependent migration influences the evolution of cooperation in spatially structured populations. Individuals interact in small groups through public goods games and reproduce with possible dispersal. Cooperators migrate more frequently when surrounded by defectors, while defectors disperse uniformly. This behavioral asymmetry reflects realistic differences in mobility and social responsiveness. Our results show that conditional migration can promote cooperation by enabling cooperators to escape defector-rich environments and cluster together. The effectiveness of this mechanism depends on baseline migration rates, group size, and the sensitivity of cooperators to local conditions. We identify parameter ranges where cooperation is favored even under conditions that would typically hinder its evolution. These findings highlight how behavioral plasticity and dispersal strategies can interact with population structure to support the emergence of cooperation. |
| title | Sensitivity-Driven Migration and the Evolution of Cooperation in Multi-Player Games on Structured Populations |
| topic | Populations and Evolution 91A25, 60J70 |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2509.01126 |