Strata-Sword: A Hierarchical Safety Evaluation towards LLMs based on Reasoning Complexity of Jailbreak Instructions

Fuente: arXiv
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Main Authors: Zhao, Shiji, Duan, Ranjie, Liu, Jiexi, Jia, Xiaojun, Wang, Fengxiang, Wei, Cheng, Cheng, Ruoxi, Xie, Yong, Liu, Chang, Guo, Qing, Tao, Jialing, Xue, Hui, Wei, Xingxing
Format: Preprint
Published: 2025
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author Zhao, Shiji
Duan, Ranjie
Liu, Jiexi
Jia, Xiaojun
Wang, Fengxiang
Wei, Cheng
Cheng, Ruoxi
Xie, Yong
Liu, Chang
Guo, Qing
Tao, Jialing
Xue, Hui
Wei, Xingxing
author_facet Zhao, Shiji
Duan, Ranjie
Liu, Jiexi
Jia, Xiaojun
Wang, Fengxiang
Wei, Cheng
Cheng, Ruoxi
Xie, Yong
Liu, Chang
Guo, Qing
Tao, Jialing
Xue, Hui
Wei, Xingxing
contents Large language models (LLMs) have gained widespread recognition for their superior comprehension and have been deployed across numerous domains. Building on Chain-of-Thought (CoT) ideology, Large Reasoning models (LRMs) further exhibit strong reasoning skills, enabling them to infer user intent more accurately and respond appropriately. However, both LLMs and LRMs face the potential safety risks under jailbreak attacks, which raise concerns about their safety capabilities. Current safety evaluation methods often focus on the content dimensions, or simply aggregate different attack methods, lacking consideration of the complexity. In fact, instructions of different complexity can reflect the different safety capabilities of the model: simple instructions can reflect the basic values of the model, while complex instructions can reflect the model's ability to deal with deeper safety risks. Therefore, a comprehensive benchmark needs to be established to evaluate the safety performance of the model in the face of instructions of varying complexity, which can provide a better understanding of the safety boundaries of the LLMs. Thus, this paper first quantifies "Reasoning Complexity" as an evaluable safety dimension and categorizes 15 jailbreak attack methods into three different levels according to the reasoning complexity, establishing a hierarchical Chinese-English jailbreak safety benchmark for systematically evaluating the safety performance of LLMs. Meanwhile, to fully utilize unique language characteristics, we first propose some Chinese jailbreak attack methods, including the Chinese Character Disassembly attack, Lantern Riddle attack, and Acrostic Poem attack. A series of experiments indicate that current LLMs and LRMs show different safety boundaries under different reasoning complexity, which provides a new perspective to develop safer LLMs and LRMs.
format Preprint
id arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2509_01444
institution arXiv
publishDate 2025
record_format arxiv
spellingShingle Strata-Sword: A Hierarchical Safety Evaluation towards LLMs based on Reasoning Complexity of Jailbreak Instructions
Zhao, Shiji
Duan, Ranjie
Liu, Jiexi
Jia, Xiaojun
Wang, Fengxiang
Wei, Cheng
Cheng, Ruoxi
Xie, Yong
Liu, Chang
Guo, Qing
Tao, Jialing
Xue, Hui
Wei, Xingxing
Computers and Society
Large language models (LLMs) have gained widespread recognition for their superior comprehension and have been deployed across numerous domains. Building on Chain-of-Thought (CoT) ideology, Large Reasoning models (LRMs) further exhibit strong reasoning skills, enabling them to infer user intent more accurately and respond appropriately. However, both LLMs and LRMs face the potential safety risks under jailbreak attacks, which raise concerns about their safety capabilities. Current safety evaluation methods often focus on the content dimensions, or simply aggregate different attack methods, lacking consideration of the complexity. In fact, instructions of different complexity can reflect the different safety capabilities of the model: simple instructions can reflect the basic values of the model, while complex instructions can reflect the model's ability to deal with deeper safety risks. Therefore, a comprehensive benchmark needs to be established to evaluate the safety performance of the model in the face of instructions of varying complexity, which can provide a better understanding of the safety boundaries of the LLMs. Thus, this paper first quantifies "Reasoning Complexity" as an evaluable safety dimension and categorizes 15 jailbreak attack methods into three different levels according to the reasoning complexity, establishing a hierarchical Chinese-English jailbreak safety benchmark for systematically evaluating the safety performance of LLMs. Meanwhile, to fully utilize unique language characteristics, we first propose some Chinese jailbreak attack methods, including the Chinese Character Disassembly attack, Lantern Riddle attack, and Acrostic Poem attack. A series of experiments indicate that current LLMs and LRMs show different safety boundaries under different reasoning complexity, which provides a new perspective to develop safer LLMs and LRMs.
title Strata-Sword: A Hierarchical Safety Evaluation towards LLMs based on Reasoning Complexity of Jailbreak Instructions
topic Computers and Society
url https://arxiv.org/abs/2509.01444