Reputational Conservatism in Expert Advice
Fuente:
arXiv
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| Hauptverfasser: | , |
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| Format: | Preprint |
| Veröffentlicht: |
2025
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| _version_ | 1866909899027382272 |
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| author | Lukyanov, Georgy Vlasova, Anna |
| author_facet | Lukyanov, Georgy Vlasova, Anna |
| contents | We study expert advice with career concerns and continuous private signals. The principal always implements the safe option, and implements the risky option with a probability increasing in the expert's reputation; outcomes, when realized, update reputation. We show a unique cutoff equilibrium and continuity. Under a relative-diagnosticity condition, the experimentation threshold is increasing in reputation ("playing it safe at the top"). Comparative statics are clean, and success-contingent bonuses map one-to-one into experimentation while gatekeeping scales implemented experimentation and learning. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2509_04036 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2025 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Reputational Conservatism in Expert Advice Lukyanov, Georgy Vlasova, Anna Theoretical Economics We study expert advice with career concerns and continuous private signals. The principal always implements the safe option, and implements the risky option with a probability increasing in the expert's reputation; outcomes, when realized, update reputation. We show a unique cutoff equilibrium and continuity. Under a relative-diagnosticity condition, the experimentation threshold is increasing in reputation ("playing it safe at the top"). Comparative statics are clean, and success-contingent bonuses map one-to-one into experimentation while gatekeeping scales implemented experimentation and learning. |
| title | Reputational Conservatism in Expert Advice |
| topic | Theoretical Economics |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2509.04036 |