Reputation, Risk, and Visibility
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arXiv
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| Format: | Preprint |
| Veröffentlicht: |
2025
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| _version_ | 1866911138334113792 |
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| author | Lukyanov, Georgy |
| author_facet | Lukyanov, Georgy |
| contents | When does reputation make experts play it safe, and what policy reverses that? I isolate a single lever - visibility of outcomes. In a two-page model with binary signals and outcomes, I show: (i) with an uninformative safe option and symmetric visibility, career concerns alone do not generate conservatism; (ii) increasing failure visibility (as in Registered Reports) weakens high-reputation caution and relaxes selection. I provide a necessary-and-sufficient local sign test, agnostic about utility curvature and allowing informative safe actions, and an identification map suitable for staggered RR adoption. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2509_04037 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2025 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Reputation, Risk, and Visibility Lukyanov, Georgy Theoretical Economics When does reputation make experts play it safe, and what policy reverses that? I isolate a single lever - visibility of outcomes. In a two-page model with binary signals and outcomes, I show: (i) with an uninformative safe option and symmetric visibility, career concerns alone do not generate conservatism; (ii) increasing failure visibility (as in Registered Reports) weakens high-reputation caution and relaxes selection. I provide a necessary-and-sufficient local sign test, agnostic about utility curvature and allowing informative safe actions, and an identification map suitable for staggered RR adoption. |
| title | Reputation, Risk, and Visibility |
| topic | Theoretical Economics |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2509.04037 |