The Welfare Effects of Policy Signalling in a Regime Change Game
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arXiv
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| Format: | Preprint |
| Veröffentlicht: |
2025
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| _version_ | 1866915480216797184 |
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| author | Lukyanov, Georgy |
| author_facet | Lukyanov, Georgy |
| contents | We explore a specific parametric example of a regime change game in which a policymaker defends the status quo against a continuum of atomistic agents who seek to overthrow it. At the start of the game, the policymaker can initiate a policy intervention to make an attack less appealing. When agents' private information is relatively imprecise, signalling is beneficial to the policymaker when the fundamentals are strong but detrimental when the fundamentals are weak. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2509_04750 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2025 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | The Welfare Effects of Policy Signalling in a Regime Change Game Lukyanov, Georgy Theoretical Economics We explore a specific parametric example of a regime change game in which a policymaker defends the status quo against a continuum of atomistic agents who seek to overthrow it. At the start of the game, the policymaker can initiate a policy intervention to make an attack less appealing. When agents' private information is relatively imprecise, signalling is beneficial to the policymaker when the fundamentals are strong but detrimental when the fundamentals are weak. |
| title | The Welfare Effects of Policy Signalling in a Regime Change Game |
| topic | Theoretical Economics |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2509.04750 |