Synthesis of Sound and Precise Leakage Contracts for Open-Source RISC-V Processors
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| Main Authors: | , , , , |
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| Format: | Preprint |
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2025
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| _version_ | 1866912576243236864 |
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| author | Wang, Zilong Mohr, Gideon von Gleissenthall, Klaus Reineke, Jan Guarnieri, Marco |
| author_facet | Wang, Zilong Mohr, Gideon von Gleissenthall, Klaus Reineke, Jan Guarnieri, Marco |
| contents | Leakage contracts have been proposed as a new security abstraction at the instruction set architecture level. Leakage contracts aim to capture the information that processors may leak via microarchitectural side channels. Recently, the first tools have emerged to verify whether a processor satisfies a given contract. However, coming up with a contract that is both sound and precise for a given processor is challenging, time-consuming, and error-prone, as it requires in-depth knowledge of the timing side channels introduced by microarchitectural optimizations.
In this paper, we address this challenge by proposing LeaSyn, the first tool for automatically synthesizing leakage contracts that are both sound and precise for processor designs at register-transfer level. Starting from a user-provided contract template that captures the space of possible contracts, LeaSyn automatically constructs a contract, alternating between contract synthesis, which ensures precision based on an empirical characterization of the processor's leaks, and contract verification, which ensures soundness.
Using LeaSyn, we automatically synthesize contracts for six open-source RISC-V CPUs for a variety of contract templates. Our experiments indicate that LeaSyn's contracts are sound and more precise (i.e., represent the actual leaks in the target processor more faithfully) than contracts constructed by existing approaches. |
| format | Preprint |
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arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2509_06509 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2025 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Synthesis of Sound and Precise Leakage Contracts for Open-Source RISC-V Processors Wang, Zilong Mohr, Gideon von Gleissenthall, Klaus Reineke, Jan Guarnieri, Marco Cryptography and Security Leakage contracts have been proposed as a new security abstraction at the instruction set architecture level. Leakage contracts aim to capture the information that processors may leak via microarchitectural side channels. Recently, the first tools have emerged to verify whether a processor satisfies a given contract. However, coming up with a contract that is both sound and precise for a given processor is challenging, time-consuming, and error-prone, as it requires in-depth knowledge of the timing side channels introduced by microarchitectural optimizations. In this paper, we address this challenge by proposing LeaSyn, the first tool for automatically synthesizing leakage contracts that are both sound and precise for processor designs at register-transfer level. Starting from a user-provided contract template that captures the space of possible contracts, LeaSyn automatically constructs a contract, alternating between contract synthesis, which ensures precision based on an empirical characterization of the processor's leaks, and contract verification, which ensures soundness. Using LeaSyn, we automatically synthesize contracts for six open-source RISC-V CPUs for a variety of contract templates. Our experiments indicate that LeaSyn's contracts are sound and more precise (i.e., represent the actual leaks in the target processor more faithfully) than contracts constructed by existing approaches. |
| title | Synthesis of Sound and Precise Leakage Contracts for Open-Source RISC-V Processors |
| topic | Cryptography and Security |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2509.06509 |